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Article 
Minding the Gap 
SHMUEL I. BECHER & TAL Z. ZARSKY 
Online and offline, relations between consumers and businesses are 
most frequently governed by consumer standard form contracts. For 
decades such contracts have been assumed to be one-sidedly biased against 
consumers. Consumer law seeks to alleviate this bias and empower 
consumers. Legislatures, consumer organizations, scholars, and judges 
constantly look for ways to protect consumers from unscrupulous firms and 
unfair behaviors.  
While consumer-business relations are assumedly administered by 
standardized contracts, firms do not always follow these contracts in 
practice. Sometimes there is significant disparity between what the written 
contract stipulates and what consumers experience de facto. Interestingly, 
firms often deviate from the written contract in favor of consumers, thus 
creating a gap (the Gap). In other words, firms often take a lenient approach 
despite the stringent written contracts they draft. This Article examines 
whether, counter-intuitively, policy makers should add firms’ leniency to the 
growing list of firms’ suspicious behaviors.  
This Article proposes that firms’ lenient approach, coupled with online 
tools and human psychology, may occasionally have surprising and harmful 
qualities. It illustrates how technological changes can turn the Gap into a 
key component in consumers’ understanding, or perhaps misunderstanding, 
of consumer contracts. It examines when firms’ leniency should be 
considered manipulative or exercised in bad faith. It then explores whether 
firms should be allowed to enforce the written contract even if they 
deliberately and consistently deviate from it.  
The main contribution of this article is threefold: First, it points to the 
Gap and examines its foundations and origins. Second, it illustrates how the 
Gap complicates the interplay between reputation, conduct, trust, and the 
 need to protect consumers. While it is generally believed that the Gap is 
harmless or even desirable, we show that it might have serious adverse 
effects. Third, it identifies key questions policy makers and courts should 
consider with respect to this Gap. 
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Minding the Gap 
SHMUEL I. BECHER¨ & TAL Z. ZARSKY * 
INTRODUCTION 
Often, firms draft one-sided or stringent consumer standard form 
contracts (SFCs), yet display a flexible and lenient approach to their 
consumers (the Gap). For instance, a vendor may stipulate a “no refund and 
no returns” policy, yet exhibit—at least in some circumstances—
accommodating, lenient behavior. Alternatively, a firm may, in practice, 
accept consumers’ behavior as lawful even though such behavior is, 
according to the SFC, a breach of contract. Should consumer law be wary of 
such a practice? Are there valid reasons for prohibiting firms from exercising 
this form of leniency?  
The gap between contractual language and corporate conduct is 
frequently manifested as a deviation from the written SFC in favor of 
consumers. At first glance, firms should be allowed, if not encouraged, to 
exercise leniency. For decades, many have complained about firms that 
exploit unequal bargaining power and information asymmetries.1 Intuitively, 
therefore, contract law should not be concerned about firms’ lenient 
practices that seem to benefit consumers.  
But, as this Article shows, the Gap between SFCs and firms’ lenient 
behavior sometimes mandates close scrutiny. Such a Gap may stem from a 
range of motivations and can have nuanced implications. The Gap may 
distort consumers’ perception and undermine rational decision-making. It 
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1 See e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion–Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous 
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2006); Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in the 
Market for Contract Terms: The Challenge That Is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723, 725–28 (2008).  
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can undermine the correct allocation of risks and diminish overall efficiency. 
It might be unfair, as well as clash with other liberal values. Accordingly, 
we suggest regulating—or at least considering—not only firms’ “bad” 
behavior (e.g., breach) but “good” behavior (i.e., leniency) as well. 
To understand why, one should consider changes the Internet has 
brought to the way we seek information. In the digital realm, we overvalue, 
and over-rely on, some types of information. Given this reality, we show 
below that technological tools contribute to turning the Gap into a key 
component in consumers’ misunderstanding of consumer contracts.  
A few academics have already noted and discussed the existence of the 
Gap.2 Nonetheless, the literature on this issue often does not address the Gap 
explicitly or misses its meaning in the online era. The literature further fails 
to consistently examine the Gap’s relation to the key issue of firms’ 
reputations. This Article addresses these issues and thus enriches contract 
law and consumer protection literature.  
When it comes to the formation of business-to-consumer contracts, the 
law and legal academia have traditionally focused on two main components. 
One is the consumer’s behavior. Here, well-known questions have been 
addressed: When does clicking “I agree” on web browsers signal consent? 
Do consumers even read SFCs to begin with? And if not, can an informed 
minority of consumers discipline sellers?3 How should the law respond to 
                                                                                                                     
 2 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein & Hagay Volvovsky, Not What You Wanted to Know: The Real Deal 
and the Paper Deal in Consumer Contracts—Comment on the Work of Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, 12 
JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 128, 129 (2015) (“[This comment] suggests that studies of consumer 
contracts in particular contexts should move from looking almost exclusively at the terms of the paper 
deal to looking at the terms of the real deal—that is, the way sellers actually behave in the shadow of 
both written contracts and the wide variety of other forces that may constrain or influence their 
behavior.”); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form 
Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 
858–59 (2006) (explaining what this Article refers to as “the Gap”); Stewart Macaulay, Relational 
Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 
94 NW. U.L. REV. 775, 791–92 (2000) (commenting on Bernstein’s approach to commercial trade usage 
and the Gap); Eyal Zamir, Contract Law and Theory: Three Views of the Cathedral, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 
2077, 2100 (2014) (promoting regulation of standard-form contracts). Some authors have even started 
examining, sometimes implicitly, some limited facets of the relation between the Gap and the notion of 
reputation or opportunistic behavior. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for 
Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 975 (2005); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided 
Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006); David Gilo & Ariel Porat, 
Viewing Unconscionability Through a Market Lens, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 133 (2010). In addition, 
Richard Craswell has considered the need for disclosures regarding the Gap and its usage. See Richard 
Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and 
Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 576-7 (2006). 
 3 For more on this question, see MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, 
VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 104, 190–94 (2012) (addressing the assumptions that some 
consumers are informed the nature of contractual clauses while others “piggyback” on their knowledge, 
and that specific entities, such as watchdog groups, might be sufficient in monitoring contractual 
language and informing others.); Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer 
Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 32 (2014) (“A central issue in these debates 
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the fact that consumers do not read—and are unable to understand—SFCs? 
The other main component that has received much scholarly and doctrinal 
attention is the language and form of SFCs. The central analytical questions 
here have been: How should courts address terms buried in boilerplate? 
When should a term be invalidated due to unconscionability? Should sellers 
be allowed to enforce unexpected SFC terms (only) if such terms are 
disclosed in a specific way, such as inclusion in a warning box? Should SFCs 
and disclosures be simplified?4  
This Article seeks to go beyond these two sets of queries. It suggests 
shifting some attention from consumers to firms and from contractual 
language to actual behavior. This Article further opines that firms’ behavior 
and contractual language may be intertwined and therefore should be 
scrutinized jointly or side-by-side. Following this logic, the Article 
examines whether, counter-intuitively, policy makers should add firms’ 
lenient conduct to the growing list of firms’ suspicious behaviors.  
This Article is organized as follows: Part I provides the general 
background. The first Section explains what the Gap is. The second Section 
places the Gap in a broader social, commercial, and technological context, 
demonstrating how it complicates the interplay between technology, 
reputation, conduct, and law. It further explains how the Gap defies and 
changes the classic paradigm of consumer contract law. By doing so, we 
demonstrate that the prevailing view concerning the Gap is seriously 
incomplete. While it is generally believed that the Gap is harmless or even 
desirable, we show that it may have serious adverse effects.  
In Part II we provide a deeper view of the Gap, examining seven possible 
incentives firms may have to create one. We further discuss the degree to 
                                                                                                                     
is the validity of the informed-minority hypothesis: the view that comparison shoppers for standard terms 
help sustain efficient terms in equilibrium. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which consumers 
actually access the terms of certain standard-form online contracts. Our clickstream data allow us to 
measure the informed minority with reasonable precision for the first time.”); Shmuel I. Becher, A “Fair 
Contracts” Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 802 (2009) (explaining that despite being “appealing,” the informed-minority 
argument “is wrong for at least four reasons.”); Amy J. Schmitz, Pizza-Box Contracts: True Tales of 
Consumer Contracting Culture, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 863, 875 (2010) (“This led them to question 
economists’ assumption that an informed minority of shoppers police fairness of contracts by spreading 
information regarding corporate overreaching.”); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect 
Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. 
L. REV. 1387, 1391 (1983) (”Consumers have incentives to become informed about important risks 
[associated with SFCs].”). 
4 See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. 545, 550 (2014) (“[Some legislatures have enacted] legal requirements [that] attempt to reduce 
consumers’ cost of reading the contract [and therefore simplify the process].”); Arthur Allen Leff, 
Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 503 (1967) 
(characterizing “simple form contracts” as those “with no especially striking admixtures of quasi-fraud 
(‘unfair surprise’) or quasi-duress (‘oppression’).”); Adam S. Chilton & Omri Ben-Shahar, Simplification 
of Privacy Disclosures: An Experimental Test (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., 
Research Paper No. 737, Apr. 13, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2711474 
(“Commentators have . . . advocated [for] . . . using simpler disclosures . . . .”). 
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which such incentives should be considered legitimate. Part III contains five 
sections, each one examining one central test case that further illustrate how 
the Gap may be manifested. Following this, Part IV discusses policy 
recommendations. It proposes various possible ex ante and ex post tools to 
minimize the unwarranted outcomes of the Gap as well as the implications 
of the Gap for empirical research of standard form contracting. A brief 
conclusion follows.  
I. THE GAP IN CONTEXT 
This Part provides the necessary background for understanding the Gap 
and the relevance and importance of this phenomenon. Section A explains 
what the Gap is, presenting a concrete example. Section B connects the four 
cornerstones of our thesis: contract language, firms’ behavior, online 
information flow, and the law.  
A. What is the Gap? 
Online and offline relations between consumers and businesses are 
governed by consumer SFCs. Despite being so commonplace, or maybe 
partly because they are so widespread, consumers do not read SFCs. For 
decades, therefore, SFCs have been assumed as biased against consumers.  
In this context, one of the main objectives of consumer law is to 
empower consumers and level the consumer-firm playing field. 
Legislatures, consumer organizations, scholars, and judges constantly seek 
ways to protect consumers from unscrupulous firms and unfair behaviors .5 
Recently, an old-new notion—information flow—has raised hopes of being 
a means to protect consumers.6 Information flow as a restraining mechanism 
is, of course, not a novel idea. But modern developments have brought a new 
twist to the tale.  
The Internet equips consumers with a variety of new platforms,7 which 
facilitates unprecedented information sharing. Such information sharing, 
                                                                                                                     
5 For a historical overview, see NORMAN SILBER, From the Jungle to the Matrix: The Future of 
Consumer Protection in Light of Its Past, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION 
ECONOMY’ (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006). For a general discussion, see JOHN A. SPANOGLE, ET AL., 
CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS II, (3rd ed. 2007). 
6 See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting in 
the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303, 306 (2008) 
(discussing the importance of flow of information from the ex post stage (after the contract has been 
formulated) to the ex ante stage (before the contract has been formulated by the relevant parties)). For a 
recent critical analysis and discussion, see Sofia Ranchordas, Online Reputation and the Regulation of 
Information Asymmetries in the Platform Economy, 5 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 127, 129–134 (2018) 
(discussing “the information society” and analyzing how online reviews affect reputation). 
7 Examples of these platforms include review websites like Yelp and TripAdvisor as well as review 
functions on consumer websites such as Amazon.  
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which affects firm reputations, is now experienced at an unimaginable 
volume. Online information flows allow consumers to learn about 
businesses and their contracts efficiently and quickly. Consumers are now 
often informed by the impressions that other, experienced, consumers share 
and spread online. Consumers can learn about firms’ behavior before 
establishing a relationship with them through the experiences that other 
consumers communicate.8  
Let us now return to the basic notions of consumer law. As has been 
observed by many, consumers do not read SFCs as part of the “offer and 
acceptance” process.9 But given the online reality, we might argue that 
consumers indeed become familiar with the content of SFCs they enter 
through the experiences that others articulate, share, and post online. In 
short, peer-to-peer information flows provide the necessary information for 
consumers, thereby substituting for contract reading.10  
Following this logic, firms that employ harsh, one-sided contract terms 
will undermine their reputation as the contractual language will be reflected 
in information flows. They will thus lose consumers to fair competitors that 
do not employ biased SFCs. If this is indeed the case, the law should refrain 
from intervening in markets where good information flow exists. In such 
markets, consumers will know about their SFCs even without reading them. 
Firms, in return, are held in check due to reputational concerns and are likely 
to refine their policies accordingly. As an anecdotal example, a few hours 
after a disgruntled consumer complained on Twitter about paying JetBlue a 
fee for a folding bike that fit into his suitcase, the company decided to change 
its (unjust) policy.11 When this dynamic systematically and successfully 
unfolds, legal intervention may become superfluous.  
But while consumer-business relations are legally administered by 
standardized contracts, firms do not always follow these contracts in 
practice. At times, there is significant disparity between what the written 
contract stipulates and what consumers experience de facto. That is, there is 
a crucial Gap between how firms draft their contracts on the one hand, and 
how firms treat consumers on the other. Interestingly, the Gap is frequently 
                                                                                                                     
8 See Kristopher Floyd et al., How Online Product Reviews Affect Retail Sales: A Meta-Analysis, 
90 J. RETAILING 217, 217 (2014) (“Opinions posted online are thought to influence consumers’ choices 
in a surprising variety of contexts, including airlines, telephone companies, resorts, movies, restaurants, 
and stocks—and utilization of online recommendations in decision-making appears to be on the rise.”). 
9 See infra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (explaining that the “contracting parties” are not 
familiar with “consumer SFCs[’] [content], which [is] not read”). For a recent interesting discussion and 
suggestion, see Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 4. 
10 In a different context it has been argued that “information about the exchange beyond the contract 
substitute for information in the contract.” Zev J. Eigen, Experimental Evidence of the Relationship 
Between Reading the Fine Print and Performance of Form-Contract Terms, 168 J. INST. & THEORETICAL 
ECON. 124, 124 (2012). 
11 A Day in the Life: Social Media, JETBLUE: OUT OF THE BLUE BLOG, http://blog.jetblue.com/a-
day-in-the-life-social-media/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2018). 
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manifested by deviation from the written contract in favor of consumers. In 
other words, firms often exercise a lenient approach in spite of the stringent 
written contracts employed.12  
When and where the Gap exists, consumers may discover after the fact 
that it was the firm’s behavior—not the contract—they were learning about 
through these information flows. Slightly restated, firms may attempt to 
preserve and enhance their reputation by demonstrating lenient behavior, 
while employing one-sided contracts. This may have multiple challenging 
results. 
Perhaps an example will clarify. David considers registering with a 
renowned dating site, hoping to find his soulmate. Before registering, David 
surfs the Internet. He reads feedback posted by other users. He looks at the 
website’s testimonials. Feeling optimistic and excited about the bright and 
loving future ahead of him, he decides to “give it a shot.”  
As part of the enrollment process, David is required to provide personal 
information and build a profile. In his profile, David notes that he is six feet 
tall, twenty-six years old, and earns $100,000 per year. Yet in fact, David’s 
height is one inch shorter, and his annual salary is merely $95,000. He is 
well aware of these facts, yet believes these small inaccuracies are a 
legitimate part of the dating game.  
On its homepage, the dating site David chose has a link (among many 
other links) directing users to a lengthy terms of service (ToS) agreement. 
These terms note that the user (David, in this case) is prohibited from posting 
any incorrect information. The terms explicitly state: “The user shall not 
provide inaccurate, misleading or false information.” Yet David does not 
open the link; hence, he is not aware of this term.  
After dating a few mates, David receives an email from the dating site 
operator. The operator notifies David that he is in breach of the contract he 
accepted when joining the site. The operator further informs David that his 
account is therefore immediately terminated and his access to the website 
denied. The email directs David to the terms discussed above. 
Simultaneously, the operator cites another term: “The operator reserves the 
right to immediately suspend or terminate the user’s access to any of the 
services, without notice, for any reason or no reason.” Lastly, the operator 
reports on a complaint it received from one of the women David had dated. 
                                                                                                                     
12 Our Article is concerned with one type of Gap: where the SFC is one-sided while actual behavior 
is lenient. Yet it is worth bearing in mind that there are other interesting gaps. One example is where the 
SFCs confer benefits of which only a handful of consumers become aware. The firm will not provide 
consumers these benefits unless they ask for them. For a detailed discussion, see Gilo & Porat, supra 
note 2. Still another type of gap is providing consumers rights and entitlements they cannot actually use. 
See Amy J. Schmitz, Remedy Realities in Business-to-Consumer Contracting, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 230 
(2016) (“Substantive consumer protections and disclosure rules . . . assist consumers only to a limited 
extent. However, such consumer protection measures are often meaningless for the majority of 
consumers who lack awareness, experience, or the resources necessary to navigate traditional F2F 
processes for obtaining remedies.”). 
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This woman has complained about the “false and misleading information” 
David posted on his profile.  
David is baffled by this outcome, which leaves him quite helpless. Not 
only did he not read the ToS, but he also had no idea that the inaccurate 
information was of crucial importance to the women he dated. He was 
further unaware of the fact that it could lead to the termination of his account, 
and possible related expenses (both monetary and emotional). As noted, 
before entering the contract with the online dating site, David read some 
reviews posted by other experienced users. None of these users mentioned a 
similar complaint or issue. David also knows, as other users of dating sites 
do, that many users do not provide accurate information about their age, 
salary, weight, or income in their online profiles.13 In fact, some of his 
acquaintances even told him that everyone posts little white lies on their 
online profiles and no one really checks or cares.14  
In this scenario, we are confronted with the legal question as to whether 
the site could lawfully terminate David’s membership. As we illustrate 
below, in order to answer this question, one should explore the Gap between 
the firm’s contractual language and actual conduct. We turn to that next.  
B. The Gap, Consumer Contracts, & the Online Reality 
Parties are generally expected to comply with contracts into which they 
enter. The law assumes that all parties to a contract concede that the agreed 
upon contract delineates and dictates their risk allocations, obligations, and 
rights. Traditionally, it is assumed that the contracting parties are closely 
familiar with the contract’s content. This, however, is not the case with 
respect to consumer SFCs which are not read,15 and for several good 
                                                                                                                     
13 See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, THE UPSIDE OF IRRATIONALITY: THE UNEXPECTED BENEFITS OF 
DEFYING LOGIC AT WORK AND AT HOME 218 (2010) (explaining the difficulties with online dating and 
suggesting that individuals will “fudge their numbers in online dating—virtual men are taller and richer, 
while virtual women are thinner and younger than their real-life counterparts”); Peter Holmes et al., Can 
You Get Away with the Ten Most Common Online Dating Lies?, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 13, 2015), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/the-filter/11922786/Can-you-get-away-with-the-ten-most-common-
online-dating-lies.html (“[I]t comes as little surprise that a recent study found that the number-one most 
common lie on an online-dating profile was about height, with many male online daters adding at least 
an inch or two . . . .”). 
14 For an in-depth discussion of the different forms of lies used on dating apps, their varying 
implications and possible distinctions to be drawn among them, see Irina D. Manta, Tinder Lies, WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 27 (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3229223. 
15 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 
680 (2004) (“[C]ommentators agree that buyers, or the vast majority of them, do not read the terms 
presented to them by sellers.”); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, Contract Not Regulation: UCITA and High-Tech 
Consumers Meet Their Consumer Protection Critics, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 
‘INFORMATION ECONOMY,’ 227 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) (“It seems clear that most consumers—of 
whom I am proudly one—never bother to read these terms anyhow: we know what they say on the issue 
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reasons.16  
From an economic perspective, the “no reading” problem of consumer 
contracts facilitates a classic market failure of asymmetric—or imperfect— 
information.17 Drafters may take advantage of consumers’ inferiority or 
ignorance and draft biased contracts.18 As a result, SFCs are often regarded 
with distrust by various facets of society. Thus, courts and legislatures are 
called upon to protect consumers from egregious and one-sided contractual 
terms.19  
So far, contract and consumer law has focused on situations where firms 
draft unfair contract terms. The natural assumption here, of course, is that 
the parties are expected to follow the contractual language. If the firm drafts 
a fair contract and adheres to it, there is no need for legal intervention. 
Furthermore, if the firm drafts a fair contract but does not adhere to it, the 
consumer will have the right to sue the firm for breaching the contract. But 
what if the firm drafts an unfair contract, yet at times deviates from it in 
favor of consumers, thus exhibiting fair conduct toward them? In the 
following matrix, one rubric has somewhat escaped the scrutiny of 
mainstream legal analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
of firm liability, and adopt a strategy of ‘rational ignorance’ to economize on the use of our time.”); 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Comment, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1163 
(1976) (“In general the consumer will not have read any of the clauses, and most will be written in 
obscure legal terms.”). 
16 See Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. 
REV. 117, 172 (2007) (“This reality, in turn, creates a market failure that results from sellers’ race-to-
the-bottom since it provides contract drafters with a profit incentive to include low quality (non-salient) 
terms in their pre-drafted forms.”); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form 
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 446–50 (2002) (providing economic, 
behavioral, and social reasons for consumers’ general failure to read boilerplate contract terms); Debra 
Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite 
Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617, 617–20 (2009) (discussing consumer 
contracts that are designed in ways to deceptively prevent consumers from being able to bring what 
would otherwise constitute valid causes of action). 
17 Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in the Market for Contract Terms: The Challenge 
That Is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723, 735–36 (2008).  
18  Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1278 (2003). 
19 Since SFCs are adhesion contracts frequently offered on a take-it-or-leave-it-basis, we focus on 
and analyze these contracts as an example. For a seminal article that calls to protect offerees who enter 
adhesion contracts, see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 1174 (1983). 
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Table 1: SFCs and Firms’ Actual Behavior 
 
            Firm’s   
            Behavior  
 
Firm’s SFC 
Harsh Lenient 
Harsh Legal intervention may be justified ??? 
Lenient Breach of contract No intervention required 
 
Should the law be concerned with firms’ lenient behavior? Even with 
respect to unfair or harsh contracts, courts’ willingness to intervene is 
context-dependent. One of the main factors that deters courts from 
intervening is the problem of ex post fair and efficient allocation of rights. 
Courts and other legal entities may find it difficult, even impossible, to 
rewrite SFC terms to replace those that are struck down.20 For that reason, it 
is important to seek out possible substitutes for blunt, ex post legal 
interventions whenever possible.  
Another important factor that may diminish courts’ tendency to 
intervene in SFCs is reputation. Following this line of reasoning, before 
yielding to legal intervention, the role of reputation ought to be considered.21 
In essence, reputational constraints may discipline sellers  and incentivize 
them to behave fairly with consumers. If sellers are concerned about their 
positive reputation, they may fear that executing biased SFCs will 
undermine it.  
In this respect, reputation complements and possibly even replaces ex 
ante reading. Rather than being deterred by the (non-existent) reading 
consumers, firms are deterred by the “gossiping” ones. The latter will be 
quick to share any disappointments or misfortunes with fellow consumers. 
For instance, a New York hotel has tried to preserve its reputation by fining 
guests $500 for negative reviews posted online. However, after applying this 
policy, consumers complained, the story went viral, the hotel’s rating 
plummeted, and the hotel ended that policy.22  
Thus, firms that wish to maintain a solid reputation have strong 
incentives to conduct themselves fairly. As a result, they will be unwilling 
                                                                                                                     
20  Cf., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 
YALE L.J. 541, 592 (2003) (cautioning against willingness of courts to admit extrinsic evidence for 
purposes of illustrating a shift in a given contract’s meaning).  
21 See, e.g., EYAL ZAMIR & DORON TEICHMAN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 306–13 (2018) 
(discussing market solutions and reviewing the role of reputation).  
22 Jackie Huba, Lessons From the Hotel That Fines Customers $500 for Negative Online Reviews, 
FORBES (Aug. 4, 2014, 3:16 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackiehuba/2014/08/04/lessons-from-
the-hotel-that-fines-customers-500-for-negative-online-reviews/#5e618cc179c5. 
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to use or capitalize on one-sided contractual provisions buried in an SFC that 
no one reads. This, in short, may ensure that sellers have a sufficient profit 
incentive to interact fairly with consumers. Therefore, online platforms that 
facilitate robust peer-to-peer information sharing have an important 
potential from consumers’ perspective—they can significantly reduce the 
risks involved in contracting and the need for taking legal precautions.  
For reputation to be an effective incentive, it is imperative that sellers’ 
reputations might potentially be compromised by biased contracts and 
actions. This might indeed occur thanks to the previously noted digital and 
online information flows. Until the emergence of the digital age, the 
traditional information flow that consumers generated was rather partial in 
scope, limited to relatively few close friends and relatives.23 Nowadays, 
individuals generate an enormous amount of content, frequently designed to 
be used by peers. It seems that online information flow disperses information 
with significant efficiency and accessibility. 
Such peer-to-peer flows facilitate a rich and influential distribution of 
potentially high quality and accurate information  for a variety of reasons. 
First and foremost, peer-to-peer information sharing may seem an innocent 
and objective way of communication. Individuals, therefore, tend to openly 
rely upon such information. Unlike firms, most consumers presumably post 
their feedback and reviews with no hidden agenda.24 Consumers share their 
experiences with no financial incentive, at least vis-à-vis other consumers.25 
Consumers who communicate their perspectives online are not trying to 
manipulate or exploit other consumers. Moreover, sharing information 
online is part of a larger feature of increased trust among individuals. On top 
of that, humans tend to follow others’ behavioral patterns and social norms 
(conformity bias or herd behavior) which are frequently conveyed via these 
online information flows.26 Last but not least, the aggregation of numerous 
consumer reviews into one overall score provides consumers with intuitive 
                                                                                                                     
23 The basic idea was perhaps most famously studied by Robin Dunbar, lately becoming known as 
“Dunbar’s number” and cited by popular books and the media. See, e.g., Robin Dunbar, Neocortex Size 
as a Constraint on Group Size in Primates, 22 J. HUM. EVOLUTION 469, 469–93 (1992) (discussing study 
findings that indicate there is a maximum number of stable social relationships that primates can 
maintain). For an accessible further discussion, see MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW 
LITTLE THINGS MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE, 177–81, 185–86 (2000). For an interesting and accessible 
media review, see Maria Konnikova, The Limits of Friendships, NEW YORKER (Oct. 7, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/science/maria-konnikova/social-media-affect-math-dunbar-number-
friendships.  
24 See Google is Dominating the Review Market, REVIEWTRACKERS, 
https://www.reviewtrackers.com/online-reviews-survey/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2018) (explaining recent 
trends in online consumer reviews). 
25 See id. (explaining that the popularity of review platforms is driven by “customers’ genuine desire 
to engage with businesses”). 
26 See, e.g., Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL 
ANIMAL 17–26 (Joshua Aronson & Elliot Aronson ed., 2011) (considering how “group pressure” 
affected individuals in experiments).  
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and handy information. In a way, it exempts them from the tedious tasks of 
reading and analyzing the abundant information. Thus, it economizes 
consumers’ scarce attention. Given this background, peer-to-peer 
information flow becomes very noteworthy for retailers, as it is a central 
information source for potential consumers.  
Indeed, online consumers share their experiences all over the net, using 
various technologies and methods of online information distribution.27 
Blogs, social networks, online forums, Twitter, and other tools allow 
consumers to share their experiences, thoughts, and impressions with 
numerous potentially interested people. By posting and sharing their 
experiences, knowledgeable and educated users (ex post consumers) can 
inform other inexperienced users (ex ante consumers). For instance, a 
consumer who contemplates dining at a given restaurant or lodging at a hotel 
can often find abundant reviews posted (on sites like TripAdvisor and Yelp) 
by others who have experienced the place. Likewise, a consumer who 
considers purchasing running shoes on Amazon is likely to find plenty of 
reviews and ratings provided by other experienced shoppers.  
This dynamic of information flow is enhanced not only by technology, 
but also by a social shift to a culture of information gathering and sharing. 
Technology enables consumers to share their experiences in a very friendly 
and inviting way, and the public has been sure to follow. At the same time, 
technology enables consumers to seek and find information easily and 
inexpensively by using search engines and social networks. This trio—
technology, sharing, and gathering—creates a new reality in consumer 
markets, with important policy and legal implications.  
In the context of consumer contract law and theory, information flows 
may have significant value with respect to reputation. As part of this general 
feature, users generate, among other things, information flows pertaining to 
contractual aspects. At times, information flows may therefore allow 
prospective consumers to become informed about the transactions they are 
considering and the contracts that govern them. Consumers can learn a great 
deal about them merely by conducting a simple search and a short read. This, 
at least theoretically, greatly empowers consumers, providing them with 
information and market power they have never held.28 This might imply less 
need for intervention in SFCs by regulators and courts.  
Nevertheless, consumers’ empowerment in this specific context is not 
yet to be celebrated. Information flows do not necessarily promote 
information about the contract per se. To be precise, there are two kinds of 
information flows. The first concerns information regarding the written 
contract. This flow is generated by people who discover and share, ex post, 
                                                                                                                     
27 See Google is Dominating the Review Market, supra note 24 (discussing the popularity of online 
review platforms like Google, TripAdvisor, Facebook, and Yelp). 
28 For a detailed account, see Becher & Zarsky, supra note 6.  
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problematic contract terms. It can also be generated by peer ventures which 
set out to educate the public about the contractual language.29 These flows 
turn out to be weak and unimpressive. Studies continuously show that the 
general public is not interested in reading contracts, reviewing and 
commenting on them, or reading about them.30  
The second type of flow deals with information about the firm’s 
behavior, which might pertain to contractual aspects. Apparently, this latter 
kind of information flow is more impressive, interesting, and noteworthy. It 
is this type of information flow on which we focus our attention. 
In a nutshell, firms are often concerned about their overall reputation.31 
However, online reputation apparently reflects firms’ conduct, which is not 
necessarily consistent with their contracts. In other words, if firms conduct 
themselves strictly according to the contracts they draft, information flows 
may indeed ensure that the contractual language is balanced. That is, online 
information flow is most powerful with regard to governing the balance of 
contractual language where the firm’s conduct and the contract’s language 
are aligned. But if the two are misaligned, information flow and reputation 
concerns cannot potentially guarantee fair SFCs.  
Firms have powerful incentives to deviate from the contract’s four 
corners, thereby generating a Gap between contract and conduct. They may 
deliberately stipulate one thing in their contracts while contemplating and 
choosing to do something else. Frequently, firms do not use and enforce their 
contractual rights in specific, yet recurring, instances. In such cases, the 
firm’s reputation or information flow pertaining to its actions does not 
represent what the contract states. Instead, it addresses the firm’s conduct 
and hence, cannot contribute to the equilibrium of fair and efficient SFCs.  
Reputation and online flow are weighty concepts that may reshape the 
law of SFCs. Acknowledging firms’ motivation to create a Gap is a 
necessary step in understanding the force and limits of these concepts. We 
turn to this now.  
                                                                                                                     
29  See, e.g., Forced Arbitration Rogues Gallery, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/our-
work/access-justice/forced-arbitration-rogues-gallery (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (identifying several 
companies with mandatory arbitration clauses or class action bans). Some of the information is collected 
by the NGO itself. Yet much of it is reported by “active whistleblowers” who the firm actively solicit. 
See also TERMS OF SERVICE; DIDN'T READ, https://tosdr.org/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2018) (listing many 
of the rights users give up by agreeing to various companies’ terms of service). 
30 See, e.g., Bakos et al., supra note 3, at 1 (finding that only “one or two of every 1,000 retail 
software shoppers access the license agreement and that most of those who do access it read no more 
than a small portion.”). 
31 See Robert G. Eccles et al., Reputation and Its Risks, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 2007), 
https://hbr.org/2007/02/reputation-and-its-risks (listing several mechanisms through which a business 
develops a good reputation). 
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II. CONCEPTUALIZING THE GAP 
As noted, the Gap can be manifested when firms allow divergence from 
the written SFCs in a way that benefits consumers.32 Sometimes a firm’s 
divergence from the contract’s language is part of a systematic, routine 
course of business. In other instances, such deviation is sporadic and 
genuinely rare. Here, we focus on the former.33 
At this point, a preliminary fundamental question emerges: If firms have 
the right and the ability to enforce or follow strict terms that benefit them, 
why do they not do so? Put simply, why do firms give up beneficial contract 
terms and generate a Gap instead? And if the firm intends to exercise 
leniency and not follow the one-sided legalese, why not incorporate lenient 
contract language ex ante? After all, some consumers might read the contract 
at some point and thus the firm will benefit from such lenient language.34  
As the analysis in this Part demonstrates, firms have various incentives 
to create and use a Gap. Sections A through G below provide seven main 
motivations, indicating both benign and malignant reasons for generating 
the Gap. This discussion also shows how possible behavioral, reputational, 
economic, and public relation incentives interplay.  
A. Enhancing Reputation 
One motivation for employing a Gap is enhancing firms’ reputations.35    
Here we refer to situations in which a firm has a given contractual right but 
does not insist on it in practice.36 When aggrieved consumers approach 
vendors for relief, the vendor will first direct them to the contractual 
provision.37 Then, the vendor will offer a consumer-friendly policy and 
forgo the formal, contractual rights.38 This might allow vendors to 
manipulate consumers into thinking that they have received 
accommodating, perhaps even personal, treatment.39  
For instance, a seller may waive her right to sue a consumer or terminate 
                                                                                                                     
32  Occasionally, firms do not exercise the rights and powers that the SFC confers. For instance, 
firms may refrain from enforcing contractual rights or terminating the contract, despite their contractual 
entitlement to do so. For an analysis of specific examples, see infra Part III.  
33 Drawing the lines between the two is certainly not easy. For now, suffice it to say that further 
empirical and analytical work is required. We return to this point later.  
34  See, e.g., Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard Form Contracts: 
Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 199, 206 (2010) 
(arguing that, if not ex ante, some consumers may read the contract ex post, once a dispute arises). 
35 Becher & Zarsky, supra note 6, at 341–42. 
36 Id. at 341. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 342. 
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the contract because of a certain behavior.40 Or, an airline may allow a 
customer to make minor changes to her flight ticket—such as a slight 
correction to one’s name so as to ensure it is aligned with the passenger’s 
formal name—even though she is not allowed to make any changes under 
the SFC.41 Since people are highly sensitive to losses,42 saving consumers 
from facing potential losses is likely to be highly appreciated.  
Interestingly, substantial and detailed online information flow among 
consumers—as opposed to the general notions of reputation this dynamic 
enhances—may temper this motivation.43 Theoretically, with ex post 
information flow, consumers may easily find out how vendors treat other 
customers.44 They can learn that the vendors consistently forgo their 
contractual rights.45 They can thus conclude that they are not receiving any 
preferable or generous treatment. 
Yet from the vendor’s perspective, some reputational benefit may 
nevertheless be derived from such a strategy.46 First, sellers may structure 
their online presence to encourage feedback,47 but there is no guarantee that 
online information flow indeed features the seller’s lenient treatment. Many 
consumers may experience the lenient treatment yet refrain from posting 
information about it online due to insufficient motivation.48 Second, even if 
there is online information that reveals the seller’s true (lenient) attitude, it 
is not always likely to reach other affected consumers.49 Faced with a firm’s 
generous response to an alleged problem, some consumers will naively 
accept such kindness without second-guessing it online.50 Others might be 
too stressed or focused on direct communication with the vendor, hoping to 
find an optimal solution. These consumers are not likely to attend to online 
                                                                                                                     
40 See id. at 341 (noting that consumers “will refrain from taking various actions against the vendor 
on learning of their limited entitlements according to the SFC they previously accepted.”). 
41 Id. at 315. 
42  Loss aversion is perhaps the most fundamental insight suggested and studied in behavioral 
economics. It stands at the heart of prospect theory, which was originally developed by Amos Tversky 
and Daniel Kahneman. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 265, 269 (1979). For discussions of the interesting legal 
implications of loss aversion, see EYAL ZAMIR, LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND MORALITY: THE ROLE OF LOSS 
AVERSION 233 (2015) and Eyal Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 829, 830 (2012). 
43 Becher & Zarsky, supra note 6, at 342–44.  
44 Id. at 342. 
45 Id. (“In the online setting, consumers can easily find out that they are not receiving any preferable 
treatment from the vendor when it ‘graciously’ decides to depart from the strict provisions of its SFC.”). 
46 See id. at 342 n.169 (observing that vendors “risk only minimal reputation damage, as very few 
consumers actually read and internalize SFCs ex ante”). 
47 See id. at 348 (noting that vendors have “many incentives” to do so). 
48  This may be because such instances are not likely to be part of the main, central consumer 
experience for which consumers are likely to post feedback. 
49 Becher & Zarsky, supra note 6, at 324, 326. 
50 See id. at 346, 355–56 (exploring reasons consumers may be unlikely to engage with online 
reviews or other online information sources). 
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reviews.51 If consumers do not comment on sellers’ positive behavior, or if 
they are unlikely to read such comments even if posted, the Gap strategy 
may indeed enhance a seller’s reputation.52 However, if this strategy is 
widespread, consumers will be unimpressed by the firm’s lenient behavior, 
as they will view it as a common and even expected practice.53 Therefore, in 
some instances and perhaps over time, this motivation will be of limited 
force.54 
B. The Ex Post Chilling Effect 
The mere inclusion of one-sided provisions may have an ex post 
“chilling effect” on a significant segment of consumer complainers.55 
According to this reasoning, faced with such provisions, some aggrieved 
consumers will avoid taking legal or reputational action against the vendor.56 
These consumers will display a passive and sometimes naïve approach due 
to their limited entitlements according to the SFC.57 At the same time, other 
aggrieved consumers will not be deterred by the contractual language. To 
these consumers, the firm will show leniency and not insist on following the 
written terms. Importantly, for the chilling effect to materialize, it is not 
necessary that consumers actually read, ex post, the SFC.58 Rather, it is 
sufficient that the seller points to the relevant contract terms.59 
As with the foregoing motivation, online information flow among ex 
post consumers may render this incentive less compelling. When suitable 
information flow exists, consumers may learn that vendors ultimately waive 
their contractual rights. Hence, consumers who learn about the actual reality 
                                                                                                                     
51 See id. at 318–19 (discussing impediments consumers face in expressing complaints). 
52 See id. at 338–39 (emphasizing that participation in online feedback is constrained by 
accreditation and motivation issues). 
53 See id. at 342 (identifying the ease of determining the vendor’s practices through information 
available online). 
54 See id. at 344 (observing that “[t]he success of online watchdog groups in the political arena 
might not easily translate to similar success in the realm of commerce and [Business-to-Consumer] 
transactions”). 
55 Id. at 342. 
56 Id. at 341. 
57 Cf. Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas: A 
Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 91 (1997) (studying the deterrent effect of certain contract clauses on consumers’ 
likelihood of taking action); Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract 
Terms: Evidence from the Residential Rental Market, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2017) (exploring likely 
effects of contract terms on consumers’ perceptions of their legal rights).  
58  It is worth noting that ex post reading may occur significantly more frequently than ex ante 
reading. See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 34, at 206 (noting the trend in scholarship supporting 
this conclusion). 
59 Along these lines, a recent study of leasing agreements has found a substantial presence of non-
enforceable provisions, the inclusion of which could be explained under this theory. Furth-Matzkin, 
supra note 57, at 40.   
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need not be so intimidated by the language of the SFC. With this kind of 
information in hand, consumers will feel more confident to demand more 
consumer-friendly treatment from the vendor.  
Nonetheless, online information flow may weaken the incentive, but it 
does not eliminate it altogether. The threatened consumer does not always 
know to what degree the online information flow is representative. She may 
not know how exactly the firms’ policy works. Therefore, some 
consumers—especially vulnerable ones—might still be intimidated by the 
SFC’s language. Thus, this chilling effect might indeed play a part in a 
vendor’s decision to create and employ a Gap.   
C. Sorting Out Bad Consumers Ex Ante 
Some consumers do read SFCs or parts of them, especially when the 
stakes are high.60 In some instances, consumers may consult a lawyer, who 
will convey the meaning of the fine print. Other consumers may become 
familiar with an SFC’s terms after the seller’s representative or marketing 
materials point to key provisions. On the assumption that some consumers 
become aware of at least some SFC terms, the Gap might serve as a signal 
and screening mechanism. This can be the case when firms stick to the strict 
contractual language exclusively when dealing with opportunistic 
consumers. If the relevant information flows reflect this behavior, 
opportunistic consumers will be less likely to engage with the firm.  
In such a case, the Gap may be helpful not only for the firm, but also to 
good-faith and non-opportunistic consumers. It can serve as a positive 
signal, indicating that the firm upholds the contract only against 
opportunistic consumers.61 Therefore, good-faith consumers will not be 
deterred by the harsh SFC at stake.62 At the same time, the contractual 
language functions as a deterring signal for problematic players who become 
aware of the SFC’s content.63 As a result, the Gap can attract good customers 
and deter bad ones. 
Professors Richard Posner and Lucian Bebchuk offer—albeit in a 
somewhat different context—an illustration of such screening, while 
referring to the SFC between a publication and an author.64 Assume the SFC 
                                                                                                                     
60 See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 34, at 223 (finding that the cost of the transaction at 
stake is the most important factor in determining whether consumers will read SFCs).  
61 See Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 2, at 833 (observing that firms may, as a result, treat consumers 
better than their contracts would otherwise require).  
62 Sophisticated consumers may even infer that the SFC at stake deters some bad-faith consumers. 
So, good-faith consumers may also conclude that there are no cross-subsidies; that is, that the SFC is not 
over-priced due to bad-faith or opportunistic customers. 
63 Opportunistic consumers may become aware of the SFC by reading it, as well as by asking the 
seller about it, or by the seller’s representation, which may highlight some contractual aspects. 
64  See Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 2, at 830–31 (offering an example of a contract provision 
between an author and Harvard University Press). 
 2019] MINDING THE GAP 89 
stipulates that the publication can pull the plug on a project that is going 
wrong. A sophisticated author, who believes in his manuscript and knows 
he has no intention to engage in problematic behavior, should be happy to 
accept this SFC. At the same time, it might scare inadequate authors away.  
Here, one might wonder whether good-faith authors too might be 
deterred by the harsh language of the SFC. That is, some authors might opt 
not to enter the contract after reading it (or learning about it via information 
flows) because of its harshness. Authors may fear that even a mild 
disagreement with their editors will be harshly viewed and lead to unilateral 
termination. True, an author might be aware of the Gap (through the noted 
information flows) and thus conclude that the publication’s behavior is not 
so rigid in practice. Nevertheless, she might fear that the policy will change, 
and that the Gap she relies on ex ante will no longer exist ex post.65 
Therefore, applying this strategic move might not seem to be the best idea.  
However, from the firm’s perspective this problem seems minor. While 
few “good authors” may read the lopsided contract, they can nevertheless be 
persuaded to enter the SFC at stake. Online information flows, or the firm’s 
agents, friends, or colleagues, are likely to allay their fears. They may 
explain to the author that these harsh terms are seldom imposed. They may 
equally provide convincing anecdotes to relax the good author’s concerns.66  
Of course, screening and signaling can occur only where consumers are 
aware of the SFC’s content. If consumers are unfamiliar with the contract’s 
scheme, they will not be able to factor it into their decisions. Another 
presumption here is that the vendor will indeed enforce the contract solely 
on bad-faith customers. This brings us to the next possible motivation.  
D. “Trouble-Makers” & an “Opportunistic Retreat” Ex Post 
Section C notes the way firms may use the Gap to deter opportunistic 
consumers ex ante. However, the Gap may be a consequence of—or serve 
as—an ex post screening tool as well (that is, after the contract was signed 
and during the course of performance).67 At times, firms might be able to 
distinguish different types of consumers. This ability allows firms to treat 
different consumers differently, while generating the Gap and benefiting 
                                                                                                                     
65 Similarly, a consumer might fear that she will be considered as a problematic or an opportunistic 
customer.  
66 For an example of the strong influence of personal stories and narratives, see Paul Slovic, The 
More Who Die, the Less We Care, in THE IRRATIONAL ECONOMIST: MAKING DECISIONS IN A 
DANGEROUS WORLD 30 (Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Paul Slovic eds., 2010) (introducing the paradox that 
while people respond “strongly to aid a single individual in need,” they can fail to adequately address 
large scale problems partially because “as numbers get larger and larger, we become insensitive”). 
67  See R. Ted Cruz & Jeffery J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed 
Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 635, 674 (1996) (discussing how 
consumers can react when they read their contracts and warranties).  
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from it. This Section explains the two facets of this idea.  
When a firm’s deviation from a contract’s language is tailored to a 
specific individual, this conduct constitutes ex post discrimination.68 Such 
dynamics unfold where assertive consumers obtain relief or preferable 
treatment after a dispute or when a problem arises. At the same time, 
ordinary consumers will not receive preferential treatment.69 Here, the firm 
employs the Gap to award assertive consumers. 
For example, a seller’s return policy states that an item cannot be 
returned once its original box or wrap has been opened. Two consumers buy 
from that seller a fan, to be used for their bedroom. They open the box, plug 
in the fan, and discover it makes too much noise. Note, however, that the fan 
is not faulty, and no misrepresentation regarding noise has been made.  
The two consumers attempt to return the product. The seller denies the 
first consumer’s request based on its return policy. Faced with such a 
response, the consumer realizes there is not much else that can be done. On 
the other hand, the second consumer is clearly not happy with the seller’s 
attitude and is more vocal and assertive, threatening to post a negative 
review online, complain to consumer organizations, protest outside the 
premises, or may even demand to talk with the firm’s CEO.70 Neither 
consumer has any legal right to return the item under the contract. 
Nevertheless, the store realizes that the second consumer poses a 
reputational threat, and thus grants relief.  
As this example shows, consumers who do not pose a threat to the firms’ 
revenues and reputation will not receive lenient treatment. Firms may be 
motivated to treat a passive, weak, unprofitable or uninformed consumer in 
accordance with the stringent SFC. Conversely, assertive and informed 
consumers will receive mild treatment to mollify their complaints and 
dissatisfaction.71 This facilitates—and is facilitated by—the Gap.  
Again, information flow may undermine a firm’s ability to discriminate 
ex post.72 The flow undercuts the firm’s ability to employ the Gap to benefit 
sophisticated consumers. With the information flow in place, consumers can 
educate themselves as to the circumstances in which the firm reveals 
leniency. Moreover, from the firm’s perspective, it may often be hard to 
envisage which consumers will voice their disappointment online. In other 
                                                                                                                     
68 Id. For a discussion of how big data allows firms to further distinguish different consumers, see 
Amy Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations: Separating Consumer “Haves” from “Have-
Nots”, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411, 1425–26 (2014).  
69 For anecdotal evidence that almost everything can be negotiated or re-negotiated when 
consumers display an assertive approach, see Johnston, supra note 2, at 876. 
70 See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 574 (2016) 
(footnote omitted) (“Consumers denied redress by a customer service representative can appeal to higher 
authorities within the organization, even sometimes obtaining redress by writing directly to the CEO.”).  
71 See id. (discussing means of redress available to consumers who assert them). 
72 See id. (highlighting ways in which information flow can cause negative consumer reaction, 
altering firm behavior). 
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words, a firm may find it hard to predict how damaging any single 
interaction will prove to be.  
Returning to the example above, at times it may be difficult for sellers 
to predict which (if either) of the two consumers will post a grievance 
regarding the store’s return policy online. While firms may sometimes be 
able to profile and categorize consumers, in other instances, firms would 
prefer to avoid this speculation. Consequently, online information flow 
induces firms to be more cautious in their treatment of seemingly 
uninformed consumers. Moreover, the risk becomes even greater once we 
consider the potential public distaste for the practice of ex post 
discrimination. In other words, the risk of generating a negative information 
flow and criticism regarding the employment of discriminating practices 
should have a restraining role.  
However, firms may be able to effectively profile consumers and single 
out the most “damaging” ones by engaging in big data analysis and 
employing computer algorithms and other strategies. This has proved 
successful in predicting consumer traits and preferences in various 
contexts.73 For instance, firms can consider consumers’ social networks in 
deciding how to treat requests and handle complaints. As Van Loo notes, 
firms “are also integrating into their business decisions means of assessing 
a consumer’s online social influence over peers, such as the number of 
Twitter followers or Facebook friends.”74  
Where firms can successfully exercise tailored ex post discrimination, a 
negative distributive problem arises. Here, uninformed and weak groups of 
consumers are subject to the strict SFC. At the same time, sophisticated and 
informed groups are treated more forgivingly or generously. Thus, the firm’s 
behavior may cause wealth transfer from weak to strong consumers. 
Alternatively, it may cause wealth transfer from consumers to firms and 
decrease overall welfare. In addition, such dynamics counter basic intuitions 
of positive fairness (which is often a proxy for normative fairness).75 
There is yet another facet for using the Gap ex post. Firms can also use 
an SFC’s one-sided terms as a way to deal—somewhat punitively—with 
opportunistic consumers.76 For example, let us return to David and the online 
                                                                                                                     
73 See, e.g., Ariel Porat & Lior J. Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big 
Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1476–77 (2014) (observing the “economic momentum” of big data and 
its applications in many areas of the law).  
74  Van Loo, supra note 70, at 565; id. at 549 (“Bank of America recently developed big data 
software that considers the wealth of family members in deciding how to handle a customer’s request for 
a fee waiver.”).  
75  See Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, Queues in Law, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1595, 1603-4 (2014) 
(explaining the relationship between positive and normative fairness, as well as other attributes of 
positive fairness);  Zamir, supra note 2, at 2100–01 (discussing tendencies of firm behavior to create 
fairness problems for consumers).  
76  For a similar analysis, see Jason Scott Johnston, Cooperative Negotiations in the Shadow of 
Boilerplate, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 12–13 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 
2007). 
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dating site. Firms may turn a blind eye to all users who write “acceptable” 
fibs or slight exaggerations in their online profile. However, some 
consumers may over-stretch this flexibility, telling blunt lies. Such behavior 
would be unfair and may very well upset other consumers. Therefore, a firm 
might tend to apply its strict policy to the latter, while displaying a forgiving 
attitude to the former. Whether or not information flow regarding this 
strategy exists, firms are likely to exercise this Gap without fearing 
reputational damage.  
The normative aspects of this form of discrimination are somewhat more 
complex. Though this practice seems fair and efficient, it might have 
problematic aspects. Such a practice enables a firm to exercise its power 
without providing the affected party with due process and without adequate 
transparency as to the differential treatment.77 In addition, at times, actions 
which seem opportunistic to the firm need not be viewed as such by all 
consumers or society in general.  
E. The Gap & the Anchoring Effect: Forming a Behavioral Starting Point 
The Gap can provide another advantage for firms: setting a desired 
starting point. This may be best explained by referring to the anchoring 
effect. In short, the anchoring effect suggests that when making decisions 
and forming judgments, people rely too heavily—and irrationally—on the 
first piece of information or data provided.78 For instance, the original price 
proposed for a used item will significantly influence and shape the rest of 
the negotiation. This sort of anchoring occurs regardless of the legitimacy of 
the initial price.  
Assume a hotel has an 11:00 AM check-out policy. Further assume that 
the hotel states in its terms of service (i.e., SFC) that it will charge the client 
for an additional day should she check out late. The hotel knows that some 
clients might check out late for reasonable reasons or genuinely by mistake. 
It does not wish to over-apply this rigid check-out policy; in fact, the hotel 
is fine with late check-outs as long as they are done by midday. By stating 
its 11:00 AM check-out policy, the hotel anchors customers. This may 
minimize check-out lateness, especially problematic cases that occur after 
midday. If a customer does need to check out late, she is more likely to 
endeavor to do so as close as possible to 11:00 AM.  
                                                                                                                     
77 On the problematic aspects of such conduct with respect to large online intermediaries, see Niva 
Elkin-Koren & Eldar Haber, Governance by Proxy: Cyber Challenges to Civil Liberties, 82 BROOK. L. 
REV. 105, 149 (2016). 
78  See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974). For more recent studies, see Robyn A. LeBoeuf & Eldar Shafir, The Long 
and Short of It: Physical Anchoring Effects, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 393 (2006); Daniel M. 
Oppenheimer et al., Anchors Aweigh: A Demonstration of Cross-Modality Anchoring and Magnitude 
Priming, 106 COGNITION 13, 16–17 (2008); Shane W. Frederick & Daniel Mochon, A Scale Distortion 
Theory of Anchoring, 141 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 124 (2012).  
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This example shows how contract terms can shape consumer behavior 
ex ante. Yet the anchoring technique may serve companies ex post as well. 
For example, assume a telecom company that sets the price for extra (beyond 
the customer’s plan) roaming data usage at $100 per gigabyte. The consumer 
is unaware of this pricing, which is offensively expensive. When an 
aggrieved consumer complains about the charge, the company might be 
willing to charge him just $50. Since the $100 serves as an anchor, the 
consumer will be more likely to accept—and perhaps be happy with—the 
$50 charge. In both of these cases, firms write their SFCs in a language that 
affects consumers’ behavior, perception, and judgment even though the firm 
itself does not strictly follow the SFC. While shaping consumer perspective, 
the Gap allows firms to appear tolerant and cooperative.  
However, the anchoring effect requires consumers to be familiar with 
the relevant contractual terms. Otherwise, of course, no anchoring can occur. 
Therefore, the anchoring strategy may be effective only with respect to 
salient terms, of which consumers are aware. These can be important terms 
which consumers care about ex ante. Alternatively, they may be terms that 
the firm highlights in the contracting process. Yet another alternative refers 
to terms that interest a consumer once an issue arises ex post.  
F. The Doomsday Scenario 
The next motivation for firms to generate a Gap relates to the “doomsday 
scenario.”79 Here we address firms that generally aim to treat their consumer 
leniently, yet face an urgent, novel, or unpredicted need to change their 
policy and apply strict SFCs. There are numerous circumstances that may 
lead firms to cease their deviating conduct and adhere to the strict SFC. 
Examples may include tight times or unexpected catastrophes,80 changes in 
corporate objectives and policy,81 or “endgame” situations such as 
bankruptcy or a hostile takeover,82 etc.  
As noted, in view of these possibilities, firms would strive to retain the 
discretion to stiffen their practices without risking breach of contract. 
Likewise, firms prefer to have the discretion to end the practice of exercising 
a lenient policy in light of substantial policy or market changes.  
Another type of market change may be consumers’ desire to switch to a 
competitor or end a contract. For instance, consider firm A, which provides 
users with cloud applications and platform services. The firm drafts harsh or 
one-sided terms of service, which consumers never read. Users typically 
breach some of these terms without even knowing. Yet firm A repeatedly 
turns a blind eye towards these breaches. However, when a user informs firm 
                                                                                                                     
79 Becher & Zarsky, supra note 6, at 342.  
80 A possible example is a massive recall or a colossal product malfunction.  
81 For instance, moving from one market to another.  
82 Here, the firm is likely to care less about its reputation.  
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A that she would like to end the contract and transact with firm B, firm A 
then advises the user that she is in breach of the contract. The firm further 
threatens—often implicitly—to sue the user should she decide to move to a 
competitor. Slightly restated, the Gap here serves as a consumer retention 
tool that may also reduce competition.  
Confronted with the prospect of a possible doomsday scenario, firms 
will employ a cost/benefit analysis before resorting to reliance on such 
contractual language. That is, they will balance the costs of reputational 
damage against the short-term benefits of generating additional surplus. In 
doomsday scenarios, long-term and reputational damages might be of 
secondary importance. This may explain why resorting to the contractual 
language might prove to be a sustainable option under such circumstances.  
G. Reducing Transaction Costs 
Another possible incentive for creating a Gap is reducing transaction 
costs. In the regular course of action, the SFC is very detailed, perhaps 
delineating when exactly the firm will exercise its rights. However, it would 
be extremely expensive, perhaps often next to impossible, to address all 
potential circumstances.83 Consequently, the firm might simply draft its 
contract in a protective and somewhat harsh fashion while strategically 
relying on the Gap.84 That is, firms may state broadly and one-sidedly their 
rights, such as terminating a contract or making unilateral changes. At the 
same time, their interests in maintaining their reputation may still keep the 
firms in check, incentivizing fair conduct in practice and allowing the firms 
to exercise maximal flexibility. When faced with unanticipated 
circumstances, the firm might consider a change in its policy—resorting to 
the contractual language.85  
This function of the Gap allows firms to reduce transaction costs while 
maintaining their discretion regarding unforeseen circumstances. As before, 
the Gap serves as a type of insurance against unforeseen negative 
                                                                                                                     
83  See Bernstein & Volvosky, supra note 2, at 131 (employing a similar analysis and noting 
practices carried out in the shoe manufacturing market).  
84 For anecdotal and interesting writing discussing somewhat similar cases see Macaulay, supra 
note 2, at 796 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (“Some firms attempt to arm themselves with end-
game strategies by placing “heads I win, tails you lose” clauses in form contracts unlikely to be read until 
trouble arises. Professor Fuller's 1947 casebook defended such drafting. He noted: “The practice actually 
followed in the settlement of claims by companies which employ a standard form for transacting business 
is often much more liberal than might be inferred from the terms of the contract they ask their customers 
to sign.” Fuller continues: “The companies . . . seek a contractual margin of safety within which they can 
exercise their own discretion free from the threat of litigation . . . .” Firms hide loopholes in the fine print, 
knowing that these terms will not be the subject of negotiations. These terms are used to ward off legal 
liability by providing bright-line rules. Rather than having to prove such things as fraud, material failure 
of performance, or substantial breach, the firm's lawyers give themselves an easy-to-establish standard.).   
85 Cf. Johnston, supra note 2, at 858–59 (explaining that “performance terms” can be “expand[ed] 
upon” but “breakdown terms are not meant to be varied”). 
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circumstances. Other options to deal with unique and unpredicted 
circumstances, such as employing broad standards in SFCs, are more 
problematic. They entail disputes with consumers and litigation risks. At the 
same time, reverting to the option of providing detailed SFCs to try and 
cover all possible instances seems unattractive. It entails high drafting costs 
to the firms, which might be able to roll some of these costs onto 
consumers.86 Consumers will also suffer because reading these documents 
will result in information overload.87 Thus, the Gap allows firms to avoid 
these problematic outcomes, at least in part, while offering several layers of 
benefits to consumers. 
III. THE GAP IN ACTION 
The previous Part pointed out various motivations firms may have to 
create and utilize a Gap. As demonstrated, firms have substantial incentives 
to set a lower reference point by drafting one-sided contract terms.88 
Building on these incentives, this Part analyzes five different scenarios that 
enrich our understanding as to when the Gap merits legal vigilance. The first 
test case, addressed in Section A, pertains to instances in which firms 
generally choose to change policy and revisit SFCs. The other four instances, 
delineated in Sections B–E, deal with firms’ decisions to adhere to SFCs 
selectively.  
A. Change of Policy: Resorting to the Contractual Language 
The first scenario in which the Gap is present addresses an overall 
change in the firm’s policy across the board. Here, we refer to cases where 
a firm switches from a lenient approach toward almost all consumers to a 
strict approach. In doing so, the firm opts to literally follow the terms of the 
SFC, which are much less liberal than the firm’s previous behavior. 
Most likely, consumers did not anticipate this change. They did not 
                                                                                                                     
86 It seems that SFCs in the United States are long and complicated. See, e.g., Clair A. Hill & 
Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with Fewer Words, 79 CHI. KENT L. REV. 
889, 894 (2004) (opining that American contracts are long and detailing the possible reasons for this 
feature).  
87 For more on this issue, see Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form 
Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 717–761  (2007); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 305 (1986); David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of 
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1986); Korobkin, supra note 18.  
88 By contrast, providing consumers better terms ex ante will create a very different starting point. 
In such a case, consumers will view these better terms as part of their entitlement. Making a change and 
degrading the contract is more likely to be realized by consumers as a loss, which may well generate a 
public backlash. For a discussion on integrating the status quo bias, the endowment effect, and loss 
aversion into legal analysis, see Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1227, 1232 (2003). 
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consider it ex ante, because no information regarding this type of event (or 
the firm’s actual contractual language) existed. However, from the moment 
the firm makes the change and acts according to its rigid SFC, information 
regarding this shift may quickly become public and apparent. Since the 
change is applied across the board as a general business practice, consumers 
are likely to discuss it and generate information flows. Nonetheless, firms 
are sure to predict this future flow of information and strive to preempt or 
counter it by producing a relevant public relations response where 
appropriate.  
Firms have various motivations for changing their policy and resorting 
to the contractual language. The central relevant motivation might be a 
change in a firm’s outlook; what we referred to as the “doomsday scenario” 
in the case of a drastic change.89 Yet, it also might be possible that the firm 
acted in this way to reduce transaction costs; i.e., it adopted an initial broad 
scope contractually and later amended its actual policies based on various 
needs and market changes.  
The noted changes might focus on various forms of broad contractual 
provisions that enable conduct modification. Some could pertain to 
termination clauses. Such changes will take place when the contracts 
stipulate that the firm may terminate the contract unilaterally. In this 
scenario, the firm would apply this term to its full extent only when a shift 
causes the firm to follow its strict contract. Yet, this dynamic can also unfold 
regarding other contractual rights, such as those pertaining to data collection 
and usage policy.  
To demonstrate, consider the following case in point: Sharon opens an 
account with a technology company that provides social media services. She 
chooses a company that is known for taking user privacy seriously. For many 
years, the company has refrained from using any technology that can track 
users or gather their information. However, Sharon has never read the firm’s 
terms of service, which state: “We may use cookies and other technologies 
to track our customers, gather their personal or private information, discover 
how they use our services, etc.”90 Sharon, who has been using her account 
for five years now, learns that the firm has recently changed its practices and 
decided to extensively collect and use personal data. Upon protesting to the 
firm, she is referred to the SFC. A similar scenario might unfold regarding 
the firm’s ability to censor and remove content posted by its users.91 
                                                                                                                     
89 See supra Part II.F. 
90 General language common to terms of service agreements. 
91 The firm might only selectively remove content, yet have broad authority to do so under its terms 
of use. This is indeed the situation with Twitter. See Stacey Lantagne, Twitter’s Discretion in Its Terms 
of Service and the Way We Define Words, CONTRACTSPROFBLOG (Oct. 13, 2017), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2017/10/twitters-discretion-in-its-terms-of-
service-and-the-way-we-define-words.html.  
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 At this point, we must establish whether resorting to the contractual 
language is legitimate, or perhaps the contract is to be understood as having 
been amended92 so as to not allow this policy change. As noted, while 
engaging in these actions, firms might have both legitimate and illegitimate 
incentives. If the firm is deterred by negative reputation, its usage of general 
language to limit costs and enable flexibility can lead to fair and efficient 
outcomes. Yet, if only insufficient information flows exist, or if the firm is 
faced with an endgame setting in which it need not care for its reputation, 
legal intervention might be required. Here, given consumers’ lack or paucity 
of information regarding these new requirements and practices, the 
outcomes of unilaterally shifting to enforce the actual contractual language 
might be deemed inefficient and unfair.  
To complicate matters further, consider an additional example which 
involves salient provisions and the Gap. For instance, a firm is contractually 
obliged to deliver a good within thirty business days, yet is famous for doing 
so within a week. At one point the firm shifts to deliver within thirty days to 
all customers, as indicated in its contract. Legal intuition leads to concluding 
that this situation differs from the one previously noted in its severity. 
Indeed, when consumer contracts are involved, it should be assumed that 
contracting parties are familiar with the salient contractual terms at issue, 
such as price, quality, and often shipment options and details. Therefore, in 
this latter case, the noted Gap and the possible change that followed should 
be within the parties’ expectations and the risk assumed by the purchaser. 
Given the clear contractual stipulation, consumers should be responsible for 
understanding that their shipment might eventually arrive only after thirty 
days, even if others have received it quicker.  
However, unlike this specific example, we usually cannot simply 
assume that consumers took all the relevant risks into consideration ex ante, 
including those indicated in the SFC which conflict with the firm’s ongoing 
practices. At the same time, information flows indicating specific, actual 
behaviors are rather powerful and enjoy high levels of trust and therefore 
would most likely be prominently considered. Accordingly, we suggest 
below that strategic policy changes in conduct which lead to the firm’s mere 
following of its contractual undertakings ought to be scrutinized.93  
B. An “Opportunism Retreat”: Selectively Resorting to the Contractual 
Language 
A firm may selectively and strategically treat a specific customer, or a 
                                                                                                                     
92 This, of course, is closely related to the doctrine of course of performance, which we discuss in 
more detail infra Section IV.B.2.  
93As we detail below, courts should consider a variety of doctrinal tools for that purpose. See infra 
Section IV.B.  
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set of consumers sharing similar attributes, in a rigid way as detailed in its 
SFC.94 In this scenario, firms initially insert various relatively one-sided 
terms in their SFC. Yet, they generally do not insist on their rights according 
to the written language. At some point they might choose to revert to the 
contractual language, such as when the customer behaves opportunistically.  
One example discussed above is the firm’s utilization of its broad 
remedies in situations where users employ “small” inaccuracies in their 
online dating site profiles.95 As mentioned,96 these inaccuracies are often met 
by the provider turning a blind eye towards these contractual breaches. Yet 
the Gap and the existing contractual framework allow the dating website to 
“throw the book” at users they suspect have crossed the line, by unilaterally 
terminating their subscription to the website, effectively banishing them 
from this digital realm.  
Another common example pertains to return policies.97 Assume such 
policy states that clothing items may be returned only if the consumer returns 
the item: (1) within 48 hours; (2) with the original tag; and (3) with proof of 
purchase. Further, assume that the store does not insist on all these terms 
most of the time. Usually, the store allows consumers to return the items 
even if three or four days have elapsed since the purchase, hence generating 
goodwill with their customers.  
Alan, a regular consumer, notices the firm’s overall leniency. In 
response, he abuses this policy and routinely buys luxurious items every 
Friday morning, returning them the following Tuesday, at times without the 
tags. The store observes this pattern of behavior and denies Alan’s returns 
based on its formal return policy. In other words, it flags Alan as an 
opportunistic consumer and treats him accordingly.  
These examples show that oftentimes a firm’s selective reliance on 
contractual language may be both fair and efficient. It prevents unjustified 
cross-subsidies (between honest and dishonest consumers) and tackles 
opportunistic or bad faith behavior. Therefore, the law should enable such 
actions and outcomes. Yet, as we will soon demonstrate, there is a thin line 
between firms’ legitimate practices and those that would be deemed 
unacceptable.  
                                                                                                                     
94 Scholars point to this potential occurrence. See Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 2. 
95 Supra Section II.D.  
96 Id.  
97  For an economic and behavioral analysis of cooling-off periods (which are a form of return 
policy), see Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, Open Doors, Trap Doors, and the Law, 74 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2011). 
 
 2019] MINDING THE GAP 99 
C. Ex Post Discrimination: Selectively Departing from Contractual 
Language 
When a firm’s deviation from its contractual language is tailored and 
examined on a case-by-case basis, it could be considered an unacceptable 
manner of ex post discrimination.98 One form of such discrimination may 
occur in response to a dispute or a problem between the consumer and the 
firm. In such instances, the firm may provide relief for sophisticated or 
assertive consumers, as opposed to lay consumers.99 Note that in the 
previously discussed scenarios (such as that addressing return policies) firms 
withdraw from the Gap and present an inflexible attitude to some consumers, 
as noted in the contract. In this example, however, the firm employs the Gap 
to award informed or otherwise preferred consumers rights and remedies the 
contract does not feature.  
For instance, consider a firm that will forgo a disproportionate charge 
for roaming data when dealing with assertive and sophisticated 
consumers.100 In such cases, firms treat weak consumers stringently 
(according to the SFC) while evincing lenient treatment for strong 
consumers that will assuage their complaints and dissatisfaction.101 Whether 
withdrawing from the Gap or employing it, the questions raised and the 
balances entailed are almost identical; the forms of ex post discrimination 
here discussed generate a specter of unfairness. One normative shortcoming 
of such action is that it generates a distributive effect.102 Such discriminatory 
practices transfer wealth from weak consumers (who are not contesting) to 
sophisticated and informed ones (who do). Therefore, the Gap is more likely 
to harm consumers with lower-income, less knowledge, and less 
sophistication.   
Here again, consider the implications of enhanced data flows regarding 
these practices. In many instances, enhancing information flows regarding 
the existence of such ex post discrimination would undermine their 
success.103 Such flows may heighten the public’s and policymakers’ 
awareness and thus restrain firms. The stronger the information flow 
regarding this matter, the greater the reputational risk that firms may face.  
Encouraging information flow as a means to restrain sellers’ behavior is 
an ex ante tool. When ex ante tools prove insufficient, courts may have to 
                                                                                                                     
98 Supra Section II.B. For a detailed discussion, see Cruz & Hinck, supra note 67.  
99 See Johnston, supra note 2, at 876 (discussing anecdotal evidence, showing that assertive 
consumers can negotiate virtually everything).  
100 See supra Section II.B for an example. 
101 For example, firms may devise a statistical model to find and target the consumers with the 
weakest voices. 
102 Here, we assume that distributive considerations are relevant to private law. For an interesting 
discussion, see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defence of Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 MINN. 
L. REV. 326 (2006),  
103 See Becher & Zarsky, supra note 6, at 360–65 (detailing various measures to achieve this).  
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consider ex post measures. Below we suggest that courts should be vigilant 
and suspicious when scrutinizing the Gap in situations featuring these forms 
of discrimination, especially where there is no information flow that may 
discipline sellers.  
In this context as well, sometimes the firm may not be too wary about 
information flow that documents ex post discrimination. This can be the case 
in instances where the firm would want to incentivize consumers to actively 
shift towards the group receiving preferable treatment. Consider an airline 
that makes use of latent contractual provisions which allow it to overbook 
flights and remove passengers from them at its own discretion. It is often 
suspected that airlines choose to invoke the contractual language towards 
“regular” consumers when needed, while retaining its loyal customers on the 
plane—thus treating them leniently.104 In such cases, the airlines (or other 
relevant firms) might encourage the flow of information about such practices 
and alleged preferences. Such a flow can motivate many other consumers to 
join the airline loyalty program—a move which is likely to generate 
additional income for the airlines.105 While these cases seem upsetting, 
perhaps they might not be considered as unfair if these ground rules were 
known to and sufficiently internalized by all parties when purchasing the 
airline ticket.  
D. Gaming Information Flow: Selectively & Randomly Using the 
Contractual Language 
Relatedly, the fourth state in which firms can utilize the Gap is by 
exploiting only a segment of random consumers. Firms will selectively 
adhere to the written SFC (or conversely choose to diverge from it) in a 
certain number of cases, regardless of the consumers’ nature. Here, the 
selection would be carried out at random, as opposed to previously discussed 
schemes which strive to identify a specific profile of consumers. With other 
customers, firms will use the Gap, display leniency, and ease their business 
and legal interaction. The incentives for doing so could be varied, mostly 
related to the greater surplus which could be derived from adhering to the 
SFC (as opposed to exhibiting a lenient behavior). For instance, a hotel 
might decide to charge a random tourist a hefty fee for checking out late if 
it usually provides its services to one-shot players.106  
From the firm’s perspective, the idea would be to exploit a limited 
                                                                                                                     
104 See Benjamin Zhang, How Airlines Like United Choose Who to Kick Off a Flight, BUS. INSIDER 
(April 10, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-airline-choose-who-kick-off-flight-united-
american-delta-2017-4. For simplicity reasons we assume that no laws, regulations, or treaties govern 
this case.  
105 Of course, the company has to balance this with the risk of alienating consumers who are not, 
and will not become, loyalty club members.  
106 Just as a quick illustration, that may be the case with a hotel that is located in a remote tourist 
area, where people usually do not visit more than once.  
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number of consumers. The exact number depends on the extent and nature 
of the information flow that the firm’s behavior generates. That is, firms will 
aim to exploit consumers as long as their complaints and voices are unheard 
or insignificant. If the number of aggrieved consumers is below a certain 
threshold, their opinions will be dissolved in the general information flow.  
We are unaware of solid evidence that points to such strategic practices. 
However, we believe it may be relevant where the firm has a strong enough 
incentive to exploit a small number of random consumers ex post. While this 
practice intuitively seems unfair and unacceptable, explaining why requires 
some additional work. The practice leads to unfair outcomes, as random yet 
equal consumers are treated differently.107 Yet the law rarely intervenes in 
the arbitrary actions of private parties. It may do so, at least in some 
jurisdictions, when the firms discriminate on the basis of unacceptable 
criteria such as race or gender. However, this is not the case here.     
One possible doctrine to consider in such cases is the doctrine of “bad 
faith.”108 It should also be noted that consumers subjected to this random 
form of discrimination are unaware of that risk when entering the contractual 
relationship. Thus, they suffer from a type of information asymmetry—
which market forces cannot overcome—when entering the transaction.109  
In addition, such behavior may harm consumers’ liberty.110 Employing 
Professor Zamir’s terminology, “a regime that grants firms unlimited power 
to treat customers as they please adversely affects the latter’s liberty.”111 
Assuming consumers have the right to be treated fairly, subjecting them to 
random strict treatment seems to compromise their “status as autonomous 
and free subjects.”112  
E. Politics and Citizenship: Selectively Enforcing Contractual Language 
The final scenario relates to a situation in which a firm selectively 
withdraws from the Gap (rather than utilizing it). Firms sometimes may 
prefer to end “Gap practices” with respect to specific customers for reasons 
which go beyond the motivations discussed thus far. These motivations can 
include external causes, political pressure, and public demand. Interestingly, 
                                                                                                                     
107 See Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, “May the Odds Be Ever in Your Favor”: Lotteries in Law, 66 
ALA. L. REV. 1035, 1044 (2015) (discussing the fairness aspects of random selection processes). 
108 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1–203, 2–305(2), 2–306(1), 2–311(1), 2–615(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2012) (detailing the obligation to perform a contract in good faith).  
109 The analysis changes, however, if individuals clearly understand and accept the chance of being 
subjected to random mistreatment ex ante. In such cases it becomes imperative to inquire whether 
individuals are nevertheless likely to miscalculate the risks involved, for instance, due to cognitive biases 
such as over-optimism.  
110 See ZAMIR & TEICHMAN, supra note 20, at 312 (explaining that liberty is harmed in a regime in 
which one party has an unlimited license to treat the other as it pleases).  
111 Zamir, supra note 2, at 2101.  
112 Id.  
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this may be the case when a firm chooses to apply its “Gap discretion” to 
another firm rather than consumers.  
One interesting example pertains to Amazon’s famous 2010 decision to 
terminate its cloud server contract to host WikiLeaks. This unilateral 
measure, which received a good deal of media attention,113 was made 
possible by the very broad language in the various provisions of the SFC 
that Amazon used for hosting. Such provisions prohibited the usage of the 
hosting services for materials the client did not have rights to, as well as 
materials that might have been harmful to third parties.114  Amazon 
itself admitted that many of its clients store “controversial” content on their 
servers, yet decided to take specific action against Wikileaks.115 In this case, 
however, Amazon chose to terminate its contract after yielding to public and 
political pressure, most notably after senior U.S. Senators intervened.116 
Arguably, it did so to protect its brand, or possibly out of fear of future 
governmental retaliation.  
In a way, this scenario can be viewed as a form of the “opportunism 
retreat” (i.e., the second scenario). In both contexts, the firm seeks to use the 
SFC’s language to deal with a problematic contracting party ex post. 
Moreover, in both cases the firm often has the incentive to encourage the 
information flow on the matter. Information flow will enhance the firm’s 
reputation and protect its public image. 
Nonetheless, this is a unique case of a change in the firm’s contractual 
policy which justifies a separate analysis. The previously discussed scenario 
involved a customer who causes direct financial burdens or losses to the 
firm. Yet in this scenario, the burden or loss is indirect and results from a 
negative externality. That is, WikiLeaks’ behavior in and of itself does not 
affect Amazon. However, it allegedly caused harm to others, and these 
others, in turn, may see Amazon as the source of their harms. As a result, 
these third parties—which as this case demonstrates could be quite 
powerful—might contemplate measures against Amazon. Amazon, 
therefore, will strive to limit their exposure by retreating to the actual 
                                                                                                                     
113 See, e.g., Ewen MacAskill, WikiLeaks Website Pulled by Amazon after US Political Pressure, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/dec/01/wikileaks-website-cables-
servers-amazon; Charlie Savage, Amazon Cites Terms of Use in Expulsion of WikiLeaks, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/world/03amazon.html.  
114 See Rachel Slajda, How Lieberman Got Amazon to Drop WikiLeaks, TALKING POINTS MEMO 
(Dec. 1, 2010, 12:56 PM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/how-lieberman-got-amazon-to-
drop-wikileaks (describing Amazon’s terms of acceptable use as prohibiting content that “may be 
harmful to [its] users, operations, or reputation”). 
115 Benjamin M. Farrand, Regulatory Capitalism, Decentered Enforcement, and its Legal 
Consequences for Digital Expression: The Use of Copyright Law to Restrict Freedom of Speech Online. 
in THE GOVERNANCE OF ONLINE EXPRESSION IN A NETWORKED WORLD 59 (Benjamin Farrand & Helena 
Carrapico eds., Routledge 2016). 
116 See Slajda, supra note 114 (describing the personal intervention of U.S. Senator Joe Lieberman 
as a key factor in Amazon’s decision to cut off Wikileaks). 
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contractual language.  
The scenarios also differ in terms of their normative outcomes. In the 
previously discussed second scenario (involving opportunistic consumers), 
the firm’s policy to follow the contractual terms enhances overall efficiency 
and fairness. In the current case, however, the firm’s decision is often 
controversial and possibly unfair. It might even lead to substantial negative 
externalities. For instance, it can reasonably be argued that Amazon’s 
conduct in the WikiLeaks case is harmful to public discourse, free speech, 
and democracy in general.117 In other words, the steps taken silenced an 
important voice. Although Amazon’s actions seem to be well-grounded 
within the four corners of the contract, such actions may have had far-
reaching consequences. Furthermore, Amazon’s policy was carried out 
without providing due process or allowing its client an opportunity to justify 
or correct its steps.  
This final example may indicate interests and considerations that go 
beyond those of consumer protection, efficiency, liberty, and fairness. It 
introduces another perspective that illustrates why the firm’s ability to 
employ a Gap can be both intriguing and problematic. This further supports 
the need to provide a framework for better tailoring the legal responses, 
which will be the focus of the next Part. 
IV. THE GAP IN LAW & POLICY 
The previous parts pointed to the Gap and demonstrated that relying on 
a system solely premised on information flows and reputation can be fickle. 
The less severe the reputational risks and related ramifications the firm 
faces, the more likely it is to use the Gap at its discretion. With that in mind, 
this Part explores the Gap’s implications. Empirically, the Gap may explain 
some findings in the literature relating to consumer contracting behavior. 
Doctrinally, recognizing the Gap is essential for crafting a more sensitive 
and up-to-date judicial approach to key issues in consumer contract law.118  
A. Empirical Findings & the Gap 
Acknowledging the Gap is vital in answering some of the most crucial 
questions related to the laws that govern SFCs; i.e., how much consumers 
know about their contracts. As we have repeatedly noted, it is clear that 
almost no one reads SFCs. Despite significant online information flows, it 
is still unclear how much valuable information is available to consumers. It 
                                                                                                                     
117 Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle Over the Soul of the 
Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 340 (2011) (“The fact that the same effect 
was sought to be achieved through a public statement by an official, executed by voluntary action of a 
private company, suggests a deep vulnerability of the checks imposed by the First Amendment in the 
context of a public sphere built entirely of privately-owned infrastructure”).  
118 For a similar assertion, see Bernstein & Volvosky, supra note 2, at 132–36.  
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is very challenging to determine the quality of information flowing to 
consumers and whether it is indeed partial or being manipulated. Finally, it 
is also difficult to establish what use consumers make of such information. 
In short, it is hard to determine whether such flows provide a mitigating 
force that may discipline sellers. 
One possible approach is to compare the bias of SFCs to the form of 
information available online regarding the corresponding products and 
services. In fact, a study attempted to do just that,119 using empirical tools to 
critically examine and question the existence of an online information 
flow.120 Interestingly, it concluded that there is no meaningful correlation 
between a contract’s biases and the product’s ranking on leading websites.121 
On the basis of these findings, the author of that study pointed to several 
potential weaknesses in the theory of online information flow. Indeed, based 
on these findings one can easily deduce that the existence of such a flow 
most likely cannot serve to substitute regulatory intervention.  
However, such a conclusion does not seem to account for the Gap. Once 
we bear in mind the existence of the Gap, it is easy to see why these findings 
do not necessarily indicate the lack of an online information flow, the 
paucity of effective consumption of such information by consumers, or even 
the need for regulation. This is because the previously discussed study 
examined contract biases and product ranking. But the Gap teaches us that 
online rankings and data flows would most likely reflect the firm’s behavior, 
rather than the language of the contracts. Thus, properly measuring the 
accuracy and effectiveness of online flows requires evaluating and 
comparing firms' conduct and practice—all while accounting for the Gap.122  
B. The Gap Analysis: Policy Framework and Recommendations 
In this Section, we detail our recommendations for minimizing the 
                                                                                                                     
119 Nishanth V. Chari, Disciplining Standard Form Contract Terms Through Online Information 
Flows: An Empirical Study, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1618, 1621 (2010). 
120 The methods of inquiry and statistical datasets are closely related to the work of Bakos et al., 
supra note 3.  
121 In some contexts, a negative correlation between biases and ranking was shown. Chari, supra 
note 119, at 1622.  
122 In recent years, an abundance of marketing studies has examined the relationship between online 
ratings and the actual quality of products. See, e.g., Bart de Langhe et al., Navigating by the Stars: 
Investigating the Actual and Perceived Validity of Online User Ratings, 42 J. CONSUMER RES. 817 (2016) 
(suggesting that consumers overly trust online ratings, which are not in line with actual products quality 
as reflected in “Consumer Reports”). For a discussion and critique of these findings, see Robert V. 
Kozinets, Amazonian Forests and Trees: Multiplicity and Objectivity in Studies of Online Consumer-
Generated Ratings and Reviews, A Commentary on de Langhe, Fernbach, & Lichtenstein, 42 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 834 (2016); Itamar Simonson, Imperfect Progress: An Objective Quality Assessment of 
the Role of User Reviews in Consumer Decision Making, A Commentary on de Langhe, Fernbach, & 
Lichtenstein, 42 J. CONSUMER RES. 840 (2016); Russell S. Winer & Peter S. Fader, Objective vs. Online 
Ratings: Are Low Correlations Unexpected and Does It Matter? A Commentary on de Langhe, Fernbach, 
and Lichtenstein, 42 J. CONSUMER RES. 846 (2016). 
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problems associated with the Gap. First, we consider ex ante tools that may 
encourage information flows and assist in mitigating some of the Gap-
related concerns articulated above. Second, we sketch a judicial framework 
for Gap-related cases.  
1. Ex Ante Tools: Encouraging Information Flows & Strengthening 
Reputational Information 
The existence of the Gap can, in some cases, undermine the accuracy of 
the information flow to individuals regarding the content of SFCs. In others, 
the Gap is structured in a way that sidesteps relevant information flows. In 
any event, full and accurate information regarding both market practices and 
contractual language would prove helpful and important in the hands of 
consumers. Effective and accurate information flows—presented in a 
friendly way that is easy for consumers to absorb—would enhance market 
dynamics and potentially reduce the role of regulators and courts. 
Accordingly, regulatory measures should be taken to enhance such flows.  
In some of the instances noted above, the Gap is applied to distort 
information flows. This is the case when firms provide beneficial treatment 
to opinion leaders. In other situations, firms apply the Gap and, as a result, 
benefit from insufficient feedback loops. This occurred in scenarios “C”123 
and “D”,124 where the firm applied the Gap generally, yet fell back to the 
contractual language selectively or randomly.  
Clearly, greater knowledge regarding these dynamics via information 
flows would prove beneficial in countering the Gap’s shortcomings. It would 
either deter firms from manipulating the gap or educate consumers about its 
existence. Therefore, regulatory steps to promote information flows might 
be helpful to mitigate both sets of problems.125  
As in other contexts, promoting high-quality information flow faces 
three main challenges. The first is over-production of some forms of 
information. This occurs when relatively few consumers generate a large 
amount of information, disproportionate to the group’s size and 
representativeness. Assume, for instance, that a firm treats only twenty 
percent of its customers in a preferable, lenient way. Over-production of 
information might mean that these twenty percent of satisfied consumers 
produce significantly more than twenty percent of the reviews relating to 
                                                                                                                     
123 See supra Section III.C. 
124 See supra Section III.D. 
125 It is worth noting here that such knowledge may not always suffice. In this context, one possible 
concern to consider is that consumers will over-optimistically assume that they will be treated leniently. 
Thus, consumers may underestimate the risk that they will be subjected to under the harsh SFC. See 
generally Neil Weinstein, Optimistic Biases about Personal Risks, 246 SCI. 1232 (1989) (proposing a 
number of theories to explain pervasive optimistic bias in comparative risk judgement). 
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this firm.126 Therefore, some measures must be applied to adjust the 
information flow to properly reflect the experience of the broader 
population.  
The second challenge in the advent of high-quality information flows is 
under-production of information. This challenge mirrors the foregoing one, 
as it is concerned with consumers who do not post reviews and feedback, 
and therefore are underrepresented. In our context, it might refer to 
consumers who do not benefit from easy access to the Internet (e.g., elderly 
or poor consumers). Alternatively, it might relate to consumers without the 
time or availability to express and share their experiences. Then again, it 
may refer to consumers who simply lack the sufficient incentives to post 
their impressions and thoughts. This may be the case when a consumer has 
had an average experience,127 when he is embarrassed to share his 
experience, or when he believes that no one will gain much from his 
review.128  
Interestingly, another group of consumers who might not share their 
feedback are those who wish to post negative reviews. Some of these 
consumers might fear personal liability lawsuits, whether or not such 
reviews are protected under the Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016.129 
Many others may receive redress by using firms’ complaint and settlement 
departments,130 making the posting of online complaints less desirable. 
Notably, the response to all these problems and concerns might be 
aligned with general policies striving to promote digital literacy and 
overcome the digital divide in society. Yet another set of responses will be 
policies and measures set out to hamper the progression of lawsuits against 
individuals opining on a firm’s conduct.131 A subset of this issue, for 
instance, pertains to the move by some firms to block negative reviews by 
including provisions forbidding the writing of such reviews in their SFCs. 
Indeed, recent legislation has moved to counter this problematic dynamic by 
                                                                                                                     
126 Employing the famous Pareto principle (20/80 rule) we might assume that these twenty percent 
of consumers will produce eighty percent of the reviews. Of course, it may well be that the twenty percent 
of the most aggrieved consumers will generate disproportionately negative reviews. However, this does 
not pose a problem since if these consumers voice their complaints, they do not create a Gap; they 
eliminate it. Moreover, in light of firms’ ability to engage in effective ex post discrimination, this is less 
likely to be the case. 
127  For a discussion on the importance of this phenomenon, see Yonathan Arbel, Contract 
Enforcement and Reputation (forthcoming 2019) (on file with authors).  
128 For example, the 10,000th review of a local restaurant is likely to have a rather marginal value.  
129 Pub. L. No. 114-258, 130 Stat. 1355 (2016).  
130 For a detailed analysis, see Van Loo, supra note 70. 
131  This could be done in a variety of ways, such as rendering the revealing of the anonymous 
speaker difficult by setting a high bar of proof or upholding jurisdiction and choice of law clauses that 
impede on such claims. See, e.g., Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 234–35 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(upholding a choice of law clause); Yelp, Inc. v Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 770 S.E.2d 440, 444 (Va. 
2015) (setting a high bar of proof). 
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prohibiting such provisions.132 
The third obstacle for the formation of high-quality information flow is 
not related to representativeness. Rather, it is the need to minimize the 
distribution of inaccurate information. Here, the main concern is that sellers 
can tamper with feedback and reviews. One distortion may take the form of 
an agreement to manipulate the way reviews are presented. For example, 
review platforms and firms might conspire to post the most positive reviews 
first. As an additional strategy, a seller might hire individuals to write up 
fake positive reviews referring to false transactions—a practice referred to 
as “astroturfing.”133 Furthermore, firms may pay individuals for positive 
reviews, or offer them discounts and other rewards.  
By and large, consumer review platforms are currently subjected to 
limited regulation and even benefit from substantial immunity from 
liability.134 It is unlikely this situation will change anytime soon.135 Yet this 
does not mean that nothing can be done to improve data flow.  
Indeed, a few steps and developments are noteworthy in this context. 
First, online platforms can—and do—launch litigation against dishonest or 
false reviewers. For instance, Yelp has reportedly sued businesses for 
allegedly providing fake reviews.136 Similarly, Amazon is reportedly 
fighting fake reviews by suing businesses that offer “glowing reviews in 
exchange for cash.”137 Amazon has even sued sellers who use its platform 
“for using sock puppet accounts to post fake reviews about their 
                                                                                                                     
132  See Eric Goldman, Understanding the Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, 24 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2017) (discussing recent legislation banning restrictions on negative 
reviews).  
133  Cecilia Brainard, Are Online Reviews Reliable? (Or Understanding Astroturfing), HUFFPOST 
(May 27, 2016, 11:55 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/cecilia-brainard/are-online-reviews-
reliab_b_10153912.html. This has allegedly happened in some markets. For instance, firms in China 
have reportedly paid powerful search engines, such as Baidu, to receive higher rankings. Jun Mai, Baidu 
Ordered to Change How It Operates by China’s Internet Watchdog After Death of Student, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (May 9, 2016, 7:20 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-
politics/article/1942912/baidu-ordered-change-how-it-operates-chinas-internet. On another important 
platform, sellers used artificial transactions that could facilitate false reviews. Gillian Wong, ‘Cat-And-
Mouse Game’: Alibaba Exec on Fake Transactions, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 3, 2015, 7:24 PM), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/03/03/cat-and-mouse-game-alibaba-exec-on-fake-
transactions/.  
134 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012) (establishing protection for online platforms from liability for third-
party content). This implies that websites can collect and publish consumer reviews without the fear of 
legal liability.  
135 For a different opinion and call for change, see Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic 
Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1149 (2018). 
136 Zac Johnson, Writing Fake Reviews on Yelp? You Might Get Sued!, YAHOO, 
https://smallbusiness.yahoo.com/advisor/writing-fake-reviews-yelp-might-sued-173135209.html.  
137 Sarah Perez, Amazon Cracks Down on Fake Reviews with Another Lawsuit, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 
26, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/26/amazon-cracks-down-on-fake-reviews-with-another-
lawsuit/?_ga=2.103061504.1052706140.1524411755-1857616339.1524411755.  
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products.”138  
Second, consumer organizations and enforcement bodies also join the 
effort to combat fake reviews. The FTC and some states are currently 
channeling more attention and resources to targeting and fining sellers that 
encourage or pay for fake reviews.139 These efforts responded to the 
revelation that firms are using sophisticated means to disguise the deceptive 
nature of said reviews.140  
Third, there are several technological strategies that strive to minimize 
the phenomenon and effect of fake reviews. One uses software that may spot 
fake reviews.141 Another is the limiting of reviews only to those reviewers 
who use the online platform to purchase and pay for the goods or services 
they consume.142 Relatedly, some online review sites include social 
platforms that facilitate the creation of a trusted community which enables 
the identification of reliable reviews.143  
An additional attempt to improve reputational information flow would 
encourage consumer organizations or the FTC to issue and release objective 
reviews. These reviews, which can also compare contractual language and 
firms’ behavior, would be incorporated into firms’ ratings and reviews. Such 
reviews may influence sellers’ reputations, improve the flow of information 
about SFCs’ quality, and thus incentivize firms to better tailor contract 
language and actual behavior. Some consumer organizations already have 
solid experience in aggregating consumer complaints.144 This data can serve 
as a good starting point and be supplemented and advanced by direct 
                                                                                                                     
138 Kate Conger, Amazon Sues Sellers for Buying Fake Reviews, TECHCRUNCH (June 1, 2016), 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/01/amazon-sues-sellers-for-buying-fake-reviews/.  
139  See, e.g., Mike Blumenthal, Car Dealers Fined $3.6 Million for Fake Reviews & Deceptive 
Practices, GATHERUP (Mar. 27, 2017),  https://gatherup.com/blog/car-dealers-fined-3-6-million-fake-
reviews-deceptive-practices/ (reporting on the FTC’s crackdown on fake reviews); Julie Bort, New York 
Attorney General Busts 19 Companies for Writing Fake Yelp Reviews, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 23, 2013, 
4:23 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/new-york-cracks-down-on-fake-yelp-reviews-2013-9 
(reporting New York’s fining of nineteen companies for astroturfing). 
140 See id. (explaining how SEO companies game the system).  
141 E.g., FAKESPOT, https://www.fakespot.com (last visited Aug. 16, 2018).  
142 For a media report on this, see Kevin May, Goodbye TripAdvisor, Welcome to Verified Reviews 
on Expedia, TNOOZ (Dec. 28, 2011), https://www.tnooz.com/article/goodbye-tripadvisor-welcome-to-
verified-reviews-on-expedia/.  
143 Amazon, for instance, develops a culture of “super reviewers” and even features a “Reviewer 
Hall of Fame.” Amazon’s Top Customer Reviews, AMAZON, 
https://www.amazon.com/hz/leaderboard/hall-of-fame (last visited Aug. 16, 2018). For a discussion of 
this dynamic, see Justine Sharrock, What It’s Really Like to be an Amazon Super Reviewer, BUZZFEED 
NEWS (Oct. 31, 2013, 4:42 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/article/justinesharrock/what-its-actually-
like-to-be-an-amazon-super-review?utm_term=.utL6kMDrp#.noaj6oOMl. 
144  One notable example is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which runs a consumer 
complaints database. Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-
complaints/search/?from=0&searchField=all&searchText=&size=25&sort=created_date_desc (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2018). 
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governmental funding. It may also be supported by indirect subsidies to 
NGOs and civil society groups carrying out these tasks. 
  
2. Ex Post Tools: Judicial Intervention in Gap Cases 
 
Generally, in the context here discussed, courts should step in only as a 
last resort, where reputation is an insufficient motivator for disciplining 
firms. When market forces and reputational mechanisms are indeed 
insufficient, firms may be tempted to apply the Gap in an unacceptable 
manner. In such instances, judicial intervention may be warranted.  
Following this reasoning, the first judicial task is to consider whether 
there is a good information flow that reflects the firm’s actual behavior. 
Where there is insufficient information flow—in quality or quantity—courts 
should consider whether a Gap exists and, furthermore, whether it has led to 
problematic outcomes.145  
As noted, firms have various motivations to generate and apply a Gap. 
While some motivations are acceptable, others might be questionable and 
worth scrutiny. Since it might be problematic to identify the exact 
motivation for employing a Gap, we suggest that courts examine the 
situation and surrounding circumstances. As illustrated above,146 the context 
in which the Gap has been exercised may shed important light on firms’ 
motivation.  
For example, if the firm exercises strict behavior only with opportunistic 
consumers, courts should be reluctant to intervene. Upholding the Gap 
against opportunistic or bad-faith players may often be a fair and efficient 
strategy, although distributive and liberty concerns may still exist.147 It 
should also be assured that the seemingly opportunistic individuals are, 
however, provided with an adequate ability to voice their opinion or 
challenge the decision at stake.   
When considering legal intervention, the courts’ toolkit comprises a 
range of doctrines and principles. Under some circumstances, manipulating 
the Gap may be considered to be “bad faith” behavior. Reliance on 
provisions which have not been applied in the past might undermine basic 
notions of fairness.148 Furthermore, under relevant circumstances courts 
might determine that some contractual provisions at stake are 
unconscionable. For instance, provisions (which were not exercised) 
                                                                                                                     
145 See Becher & Zarsky, supra note 6, at 357–60 (discussing factors that courts should consider 
before intervening to improve the information flow).  
146 For a detailed discussion of possible negative consequences, see supra Part II.  
147 See supra notes 107–13 and accompanying text (cautioning against random infliction of strict 
treatment on online users, which can adversely impact those users’ liberty).  
148 See Benkler, supra note 117, at 368–69 (“The most direct path to such a cause of action would 
be to argue an implied contractual obligation not to unreasonably, or without good faith, withhold 
service.”). 
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providing firms with broad and unilateral termination rights could be 
considered imbalanced and therefore struck down. However, such doctrinal 
tools might be overbroad and inject a considerable degree of uncertainty to 
markets and contractual relationships. For these and other reasons, courts 
might be reluctant to apply them.  
Another specific doctrine, “reasonable expectations,” has been adopted 
and employed mainly in insurance cases.149 If employed in our context, 
consumers might argue that firms’ lenient treatment (as opposed to the one-
sided SFCs) vis-à-vis other consumers has shaped their “reasonable 
expectations.” Therefore, if firms revert to the contractual language, it may 
violate such expectations.  
Of course, determining what should be considered a reasonable 
expectation is not easy.150 A reasonable expectation should be based, at least 
in part, on an inquiry as to whether an effective information flow exists and 
whether this flow reflects the contract or the firm’s behavior. Here, the firms 
will try and argue that the expectations must reflect the contractual language, 
and that other data sources are unreliable. Firms are also likely to argue 
against the application of this doctrine to new contexts beyond insurance 
markets. Thus, applying this doctrine would be an uphill battle as well.  
Another potential doctrine is that of “usage of trade,” which refers to a 
general practice regularly observed, creating a legitimate expectation to be 
followed.151 As the others, this doctrine is not a panacea. In situations in 
which firms engage in discrimination of specific consumers, the doctrine 
might not provide relief. This is because the specific treatment may be 
related to chosen consumers (or a group of consumers) rather than a general 
practice. However, where there is a general change in the firm’s practice (as 
discussed above with respect to Scenario A),152 the Gap might indicate and 
                                                                                                                     
149 According to this doctrine, “[i]n dealing with standardized [consumer] contracts courts have to 
determine what the weaker contracting party could legitimately expect by way of services according to 
the enterpriser’s ‘calling,’ and to what extent the stronger party disappointed reasonable expectations 
based on the typical life situation.” Gray v. Zurich Ins., 419 P.2d 168, 172 (Cal. 1966) (quoting Friedrich 
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 637 (1943)); see also Darner Motor Sales, Inc. 
v. Universal Underwriters Ins., 682 P.2d 388, 394–95 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (upholding a similar 
formulation of the reasonable expectations doctrine). 
150 For an interesting proposal, see Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 559–60. Another possibility 
might be to use neuro-science findings that can reveal what consumers actually think. Cf. Mark 
Bartholomew, Neuromarks, 103 MINN. L. REV. 521 (2018). 
151 See U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017) (defining a “usage of trade” 
as “any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade 
as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question”); see also 
Uri Benoliel, The Course of Performance Doctrine in Commercial Contracts: An Empirical Analysis, 68 
DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming) (defining a “usage of trade [as] a general practice having regularity of 
observance in commerce”); David McGowan, Recognizing Usages of Trade: A Case Study from 
Electronic Commerce, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 167, 167 (2002) (discussing the definition of a “usage 
of trade”).  
152 Supra Section III.A.  
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reflect a change in trade practices. In such cases, and based on the “usage of 
trade” doctrine, consumers might be able to rely upon this new conduct, as 
opposed to the contractual language.   
Another noteworthy judicial tool is to declare that the terms of the 
contract have changed in light of the firm’s behavior, while invoking the 
“Course of Performance” doctrine.153 In such a case, and relying on this 
doctrine, courts could close the Gap and modify the agreement along the 
lines of the firm’s actual actions. Here, contract law has accepted the notion 
that contract terms may be modified by the parties’ behavior, adding new 
obligations and privileges.154 Accepting such changes will, in turn, protect 
reasonable reliance and expectation.155  
Interestingly, in some states this doctrine enables contract modification 
even if the original contract included a “No Oral Modification” clause, 
which clearly stipulated that all amendments must be made in writing.156 
This additional doctrinal step is important in our context, as without it, SFC 
drafters can easily include a “No Oral Modification” provision in their 
agreements. If “No Oral Modification” clauses trump, firms applying them 
will sidestep much of the discussion to follow and render the “Course of 
Performance” doctrine moot.  
Before proceeding, it is important to note that there are several strong 
general arguments against the application of the “Course of Performance” 
doctrine. Yet, there are also reasonable counterclaims in our context. First, 
one might argue that the firm’s conduct does not reflect the way it intends 
courts to interpret its contract. Therefore, performance alone should not lead 
to contract modification.157 For contract interpretation, the firm expects 
courts to rely on the precise text used in the written contract. Simply put, 
according to this argument courts should be mostly reluctant to apply the 
doctrine, which goes against the contractual language and against the 
parties’ intentions.  
We concede this argument may carry weight in business-to-business 
commercial contexts: situations where two informed parties enter a contract 
after negotiating over its content. However, the argument fails in the 
business-to-consumer realm, where consumers do not read their 
standardized contracts. Here, one can hardly argue that consumers have 
agreed that the SFC will trump future modifications and constitute the final 
document to be considered by courts.  
                                                                                                                     
153 Benoliel, supra note 151, at 4.  
154 Id. at 6. 
155 Id. at 10 n.31; Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 
CHI. L. REV. 781, 787 (1999). Another reason for introducing this doctrine is that it leads to the reflection 
of the parties’ intention. Given the context of SFCs, this justification is relatively weak. 
156 Benoliel, supra note 151, at 14–15, 17–18; see also Ben-Shahar, supra note 155, at 791 (noting 
that opting out of these modification rules is often not simple).  
157 Benoliel, supra note 151, at 11 (referring to Schwartz & Scott, supra note 20, at 592). 
 
 112 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1 
The second often-voiced concern regarding the application of this 
doctrine is that accepting the “Course of Performance” doctrine will 
incentivize firms to act rigidly. That is, firms will be reluctant to exercise 
flexibility throughout the contractual relationship even though such 
flexibility is efficient, 158 knowing that such a behavior will later backfire in 
court.159 While this general claim has merit, our analysis above presented the 
various nuanced motivations guiding firms when deciding whether to 
generate a Gap. Therefore, some motivations to nonetheless provide 
flexibility will still persist. Furthermore, and as noted, “flexibility” is too 
broad a term to encapsulate the firm’s conduct here. Flexibility might lead 
to substantial, various detriments for consumers. Therefore, this general 
argument of promoting flexibility should be here replaced with the elaborate 
discussion this Article provided; including the need to factor in the various 
facets and dimensions of online information flows. 
Notably, the “Course of Performance” doctrine works well in the case 
of Scenario A,160 where the firm changed its overall strategy and behavior. 
However, one may wonder how courts should approach instances in which 
the consumer has no history of a firm’s performance, or that the firm has 
chosen to selectively treat a specific consumer rigidly (as opposed to others, 
who are receiving lenient treatment). This specific consumer can hardly 
claim the firm’s course of performance towards him led to contract 
modification. Thus, to fit the paradigm at hand, the doctrine itself must be 
modified.  
This brings us to an important facet of our suggested approach towards 
the “Course of Performance” doctrine. Here, we suggest that when applying 
this principle in Gap cases, courts should factor into their analysis firms’ 
behavior towards third parties. We opine that when a firm acts in a certain 
way vis-à-vis specific consumers, this behavior may also set the tone for the 
relation, or “performance,” between the firm and other consumers. Slightly 
restated, firms’ conduct towards their customers can legitimately shape other 
consumers’ expectations and reliance: the crucial elements that this doctrine 
aims to protect. This is all a result of the information flows addressed above.  
At the procedural level, proving the presence of a Gap in court or to a 
                                                                                                                     
   158 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 155, at 784 (discussing how the “‘rigidity effect’ might frustrate 
the Code’s objective of encouraging flexibility”). 
159 Id. at 13 (referring to Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 238 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014) and Lisa Bernstein, Merchant 
Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1765 (1996)). For a critique of this basic argument and a presentation of a more sophisticated 
version of it, see Ben-Shahar, supra note 155, at 787. The literature on this issue also includes additional 
reasons to refrain from applying this doctrine, such as the high litigation costs it might entail, as well as 
the firms’ costs to monitor their employees, whose actions might now generate liability and lead to 
contract modification. These are, no doubt, substantial costs which must be balanced by the courts when 
considering the application of this doctrine in “Gap”-like situations.  
160 Supra, Section III.A. 
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regulator may be challenging.161 It would be very difficult for a consumer to 
prove that an overall shift from the contractual language has taken place.162 
It is also challenging for an individual to go beyond her limited interaction 
with the firm and seek records and evidence. Therefore, most often 
consumers should not be expected to provide information as to how a given 
firm interacts with other consumers. Slightly restated, due to these 
information asymmetries, placing the burden of proof on consumers to prove 
a Gap was created and possibly abused will often be unfair and can lead to 
the failure of their case. To prevent this, courts can employ presumptions to 
shift the burden of proof onto firms.  
Since firms control information as to their actions, they can easily dispel 
unsubstantiated claims regarding the creation of a Gap. Such a presumption 
can be used (and a shift in the burden applied), for instance, when a firm 
employs harsh, one-sided terms while its online reviews and reputation are 
excellent. In addition, the burden might be shifted if a substantial amount of 
reviews regarding the firm’s behavior contradict the contractual language. 
This might indicate the existence of a Gap, and a practice which may fall 
within one of the contractual doctrines noted above. In these cases, firms 
might be required to prove they indeed treat all their consumers the same. 
To conclude, courts have a variety of tools to explore and employ in Gap 
cases. Additional possible doctrines may include unfair surprise, estoppel, 
and a ban on selective enforcement. As this Article takes the first steps in 
sketching out a new framework, an in-depth analysis of all these doctrines 
is beyond its scope. We hope to undertake such an analysis in the future, 
once the theoretical and doctrinal foundations of our proposal develop.  
C. Shortcomings, Limitations, and Potential Obstacles 
Before concluding, it is important to detail three main shortcomings, 
limitations, and potential obstacles in our analysis. The first issue is a limit 
to its scope. Our analysis addresses classic SFCs (or SFC provisions) that 
consumers do not read. In such cases, information flow may substitute 
reading in the context of disciplining sellers. Where the Gap exists, 
information flow may not generate the necessary pressure to restrain sellers 
and encourage them to draft fair SFCs.  
However, it is imperative to note instances where consumers are likely 
to read their SFCs rather than relying on information flows. In some 
relatively rare instances—such as book contracts, real-estate contracts and 
                                                                                                                     
161 Cf. Benoliel, supra note 151, at 14–15 (making a similar point with regards to the “course of 
performance” doctrine). 
162 In some instances, this might not be very difficult, as consumers could point to the actual reviews 
they have read. However, these reviews have not been written by the firm and might not be available 
after the fact. For that reason, additional analytical steps detailed below are required. 
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day-care agreements—consumers (or their lawyers) tend to read SFCs (or 
part of them).163 Where consumers read their SFCs, they may become 
familiar with their content via reading—rather than via information flows. 
And where consumers are not lured or manipulated by the Gap, our analysis 
does not hold, and requires some tinkering.164  
The second problem that may arise from our recommendations is the 
enhancement of ex ante discrimination. If sellers lose the ability to 
discriminate among their customers ex post, they may be more motivated to 
engage in ex ante discrimination. For instance, firms may be more tempted 
to use big data and employ sophisticated online segmentation. That is, they 
may seek to regain their ability to provide different consumers different 
treatment, by profiling consumers ex ante and providing different consumers 
with different contractual terms.165 In other words, firms will strive to 
discriminate in any event, and eliminating the Gap will merely shift 
discrimination to other realms—perhaps to those society finds to be worse.  
Our response to this concern has several layers. First, it should be 
acknowledged that firms already engage in ex ante discrimination.166 Thus, 
it is doubtful whether eliminating ex post discrimination will make things 
worse. Second, ex ante discrimination is potentially more transparent and 
might therefore—at least in some circumstances—be less harmful than ex 
post discrimination practices (such as those facilitated by the Gap). When 
firms engage in ex ante discrimination, consumers might not know that they 
are being discriminated against. However, they can become aware of the 
terms they are actually offered (that is, even if these terms are worse than 
                                                                                                                     
163 See Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 34, at 212–13 (distinguishing car rental, laundry, day-
care, and bank account SFCs).  
164  In addition to the analysis here noted, courts may still review one-sided terms in consumer 
contracts using other doctrines and principles. Such doctrines and principles are not necessarily 
dependent on—or related to—whether the consumer has read, or had the opportunity to read the form 
contract at stake. In many jurisdictions, such as Germany, New Zealand, and Israel, courts are vested 
with the discretion to examine and nullify suspicious terms. See, e.g., Standard Contracts Law, 5742-
1964, §§ 3–5, 17, (1982) (Isr.) (granting Israeli courts and a special tribunal the authority to annul or 
change disadvantageous terms in standard form contracts); Fair Trading Act 1986, ss 26A,  46H–46M 
(N.Z.) (granting New Zealand courts the authority to declare that a term in a standard form consumer 
contract is an unfair term and detailing the consequences of said declaration). For Germany’s broad 
application of “fairness control” to standard form contracts, see Thomas Zerres, Principles of the German 
Law on Standard Terms of Contracts 12–17, available at 
www.jurawelt.com/sunrise/media/mediafiles/14586/German_Standard_Terms_of_Contract_Thomas_Z
erres.pdf. 
165  Cf. Oren Bar-Gill, Algorithmic Price Discrimination: When Demand is a Function of Both 
Preferences and (Mis)perceptions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming). Generally speaking, the same 
tactics that vendors have utilized for price discrimination might also be in play for other sorts of 
discrimination. For instance, some stores may engage in return policy discrimination by not allowing 
returns for consumers from some areas, identified, for example, by their residential zip code. 
166 Allesandro Acquisti et al., The Economics of Privacy, 54 J. ECON. LIT. 442, 446–47 (2016); see 
also Natasha Singer, The Government’s Consumer Data Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2015, at BU3 
(quoting Google’s chief economist).  
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the terms granted to other consumers). Consumers may be able to review 
those terms, or more likely—learn about those terms via online information 
flows—and hence make relatively informed decisions. At the same time, ex 
post discrimination of the kind discussed here is neither transparent nor 
predictable. Due to the Gap, consumers cannot know at the time they enter 
the agreement if they will be subject to lenient or harsh policies later on. 
This, as we noted, also harms their autonomy and liberty. Third, we opine 
that since ex ante discrimination may indeed pose a problem, stronger 
enforcement of rules against ex ante discrimination should indeed be 
explored.167  
The last possible concern with our thesis is excessive litigation. As 
noted, consumers do not typically hold the relevant information relating to 
the Gap, so the Gap may be hard to prove. Moreover, even once proven, 
sellers’ motivations may be hard to determine as well. This implies that 
proving a Gap and its allegedly unfair consequences and implications may 
involve costly litigation. This carries its own costs for the parties involved 
and for the public more generally. For that reason, the key to solving this 
matter would also involve introducing unique procedural measures. As we 
delineated above,168 shifting burdens in suspicious instances may an 
important step in that direction.  
CONCLUSION 
Courts and legislators have long been struggling to determine which 
contractual provisions in SFCs should not be enforced. In this Article, we 
suggest a new approach that might assist policy makers to form a more 
holistic, updated approach. While doing so, we illustrate how digital 
realities, online peer-to-peer information flows, consumer standard form 
contracts, and firms’ conduct interact.  
Traditionally, contract law has assessed the fairness of the contractual 
language in isolation, without looking into the parties’ behavior. This 
behavior vis-à-vis the contractual language is assumed to be relevant mainly 
with respect to doctrines such as breach of contract, estoppel, or bad faith. 
Contract law also insists on drawing a line between pre-contract and post-
contract stages. Our analysis blurs these lines and demonstrates why this 
distinction cannot always hold. Furthermore, post-contract behavior 
regarding one group of consumers can influence pre-contract decisions of 
another group.  
Consumer markets are elaborate mazes, and some of the information 
                                                                                                                     
167 For a discussion of a similar balance of interests between ex ante discrimination and the 
protection of privacy interests, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 363, 371 (2008). 
168 See supra note 162 and subsequent text.  
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sets they feature amount to consumer mousetraps. To avoid such traps, our 
analysis offers two main lessons. First, the Gap is not an innocent 
phenomenon but one that calls for close scrutiny. In the context of consumer 
assent to SFCs, much of the literature focuses on the way consumers make 
decisions, form preferences, and behave. However, we suggest attributing 
much more attention and importance to firms’ behavior ex post.169 
Therefore, regulating behavior in the context of SFCs should not be confined 
to behaviors that amount to unfair contracting practices, deceptive behavior, 
or breach. It should also encompass the nuanced implications of “good,” 
lenient behavior.  
Second, online information flow is a two-sided coin. On the one hand, 
high-quality information flow conveys important information intuitively and 
smoothly. For that reason, it can advance consumer protection and reduce 
the need for legal intervention. On the other hand, the Internet changes 
accepted notions of social trust while creating new forms of trusted parties. 
As a result, firms might be tempted to tinker with this reality and exploit it 
unfairly. In our context, self-interested firms can manipulate information 
flow by utilizing the Gap.  
In such cases, information flow can aggravate the problem of 
information asymmetry, rather than cure it. It can lead consumers to form a 
distorted perspective, which in turn will result in sub-optimal decision 
making. The traditional concern of asymmetric information relates to 
consumer form contracts. We, however, suggest that paying close attention 
to asymmetric information in firms’ behavior is frequently a crucial point 
not to be missed.  
 
                                                                                                                     
169 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
1745, 1777–78 (2014) (exploring whether highlighting firms’ behavior changes the way we view 
consumers’ behavior, responsibility, and blame).  
